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This paper develops a model with partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage shocks to quantify risk
sharing, and to decompose inequality into life-cycle shocks versus initial heterogeneity in preferences
and productivity. Closed-form solutions are obtained for equilibrium allocations and for moments
of the joint distribution of consumption, hours, and wages. We prove identiﬁcation and estimate the
model with data from the CEX and the PSID over the period 1967—2006. We ﬁnd that (i) 40% of
permanent wage shocks pass through to consumption; (ii) the share of wage risk insured privately
increased until the early 1980s and remained stable thereafter; (iii) life-cycle productivity shocks
account for half of the cross-sectional variance of wages and earnings, but for much less of dispersion
in consumption or hours worked.
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nization, and Performance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
How e®ectively can households smooth idiosyncratic wage °uctuations via private insurance
arrangements and labor supply adjustments? To what degree has the four-decade-long rise
in US wage dispersion passed through to inequality in consumption and hours worked?
More broadly, what is the role of uninsurable life-cycle shocks to wages relative to initial
heterogeneity in skills and preferences in accounting for observed inequality? The purpose
of this paper is to measure the degree of risk sharing achieved by US households, and to
examine how it has changed over the past forty years. Quantifying the extent of private
risk sharing is important in determining the appropriate role for redistributive taxation and
public insurance programs.
The measurement of risk sharing has been approached in two ways in the existing lit-
erature. The ¯rst approach is to build a structural equilibrium model, and to use it as
an arti¯cial laboratory to study the response of consumption to individual income °uctua-
tions. One prominent example is the standard incomplete-markets model, where households
self-insure against income °uctuations by borrowing and lending via a risk-free bond (see
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) for a survey). The key limitation of the struc-
tural approach is that the amount of risk sharing in the model is always sensitive to the model
assumptions regarding the asset market structure and the insurance channels available to
agents.
The alternative approach in the literature is to quantify the overall degree of insurability
of income innovations, while remaining somewhat agnostic about the speci¯c sources of risk
sharing. Deaton (1997) pioneered this methodology.1 An important recent example of this
less structural approach to measuring insurance is Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008),
who use longitudinal data on income and consumption (constructed through an imputation
procedure) to estimate the degree to which permanent changes in earnings pass through
to household consumption. This methodology requires a long panel of high-quality income
1Deaton (1997, pp. 372-374) writes: \Saving is only one of the ways people can protect their consumption
against °uctuations in their income. An alternative is to rely on other people, to share risk with friends
and kin, with neighbors, or with other anonymous participants through private or government insurance
schemes, or through participation in ¯nancial markets ... [T]he very multiplicity of existing mechanisms
makes it likely that there is at least partial insurance through ¯nancial or social institutions, and that such
risk sharing adds to the possibilities for autarkic consumption smoothing through intertemporal transfers
of money or goods ... Although it is possible to examine the mechanisms, the insurance contracts, tithes
and transfers, their multiplicity makes it attractive to look directly at the magnitude that is supposed to be
smoothed, namely consumption."
1and consumption data. Moreover, the estimation procedure embeds assumptions on the
equilibrium process for consumption, and pass-through coe±cients will be biased if these
assumptions are not satis¯ed (see Kaplan and Violante (2010) for a discussion).
This paper pursues a new approach to measuring risk sharing that combines elements
from both these traditions. We estimate the overall amount of private consumption insurance
in the context of a structural equilibrium model that allows for a °exible ¯nancial market
structure { and thus does not \hardwire" agents' access to insurance. Our framework is
an augmented version of the standard incomplete-markets model with idiosyncratic wage
risk. We assume isoelastic preferences over consumption and hours worked, and allow for
heterogeneity in the taste for work. Wages have two orthogonal stochastic components,
which we label (privately) \insurable" and \uninsurable," respectively. Agents can perfectly
smooth the \insurable" component. The \uninsurable" component can only be smoothed
via adjustments to own hours worked, via government redistribution, or through borrowing
and lending in a riskless bond.
The equilibrium allocations of consumption and hours emerging from our framework can
be expressed in closed form, as log-linear functions of the idiosyncratic distaste for work
and of the two wage components. An important step toward characterizing allocations is
to show that in equilibrium the bond is not used to smooth \uninsurable" shocks { a result
that extends the logic in Constantinides and Du±e (1996) to a much richer environment.
The analytical derivation of allocations is the ¯rst theoretical contribution of the paper.
These closed-form log-linear allocations make it possible to compute and interpret cross-
sectional variances and covariances of the joint equilibrium distribution of wages, hours, and
consumption. We use information contained in both the \macro facts" on the distributions
of these variables in levels that have motivated recent macroeconomic investigations (e.g.,
Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Krueger and Perri, 2006; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
2010b), and the \micro facts" on the distributions in growth rates that have been the primary
focus of labor economists (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston,
2008). The analytical expressions for these cross-sectional moments allow us to formally
prove identi¯cation of all the model's parameters given standard micro data sets { something
that is usually impossible in large scale structural models. Proof of identi¯cation is our second
theoretical contribution.
Most of the literature on risk sharing focuses on how labor market shocks transmit to
consumption (see Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a recent survey). We argue that data on
2labor supply are also informative about the degree of insurance, because theory predicts that
households should adjust hours more strongly in response to insurable versus uninsurable
wage increases, re°ecting the absence of o®setting wealth e®ects in the former case. We prove
that the model is in fact fully identi¯ed given only panel data on wages and hours worked,
i.e., without any consumption data. Given uncertainty about the quality of self-reported
consumption expenditures (e.g., Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura, 2007; Aguiar and Bils,
2011), it is useful to be able to estimate insurance without using consumption data, and to
assess whether estimates of insurance derived from wage and hours data alone are consistent
with those that use consumption moments. Exploiting moments involving hours worked to
quantify risk sharing is our third contribution.
We estimate the model using data on wages and hours from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) over the period 1967-2006, and consumption data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) over the period 1980-2006. The estimated model replicates
well the evolution of the empirical cross-sectional distribution over wages, hours worked
and consumption, both over time and over the life cycle. The estimated value for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is 1=1:56; while the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply with respect to pre-tax wages is 0:38. We estimate signi¯cant heterogeneity
in the distaste for work, which is needed to account for the observed joint distribution over
consumption and hours worked. The estimation also recovers time series for the insurable
and uninsurable fractions of wage dispersion, which allow us to address the three questions
that motivate our investigation.
First, we ask how much individual wage risk can be smoothed, and what are the relative
contributions to smoothing of private risk sharing, government-provided insurance, and la-
bor supply adjustments. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) argue that a natural way
to measure consumption insurance is to quantify how much of a typical permanent shock
to wages passes through to consumption. Our model suggests that this pass-through coe±-
cient is around 40%, or equivalently that 60% of permanent wage °uctuations are e®ectively
smoothed. Where does this insurance come from? Half re°ects private risk sharing, one-third
re°ects progressive taxation, and the rest re°ects adjustments to labor supply. A caveat is
in order. A common alternative metric for consumption smoothing in the literature is the
ratio of the within-cohort change in the variance of log consumption to the corresponding
change in the variance of log income (e.g., Blundell and Preston, 1998; Storesletten, Telmer,
and Yaron, 2004a). In our framework the two measures of insurance coincide only when pro-
3gressive taxation and labor supply are absent as insurance channels. Our baseline parameter
estimates indicate a signi¯cantly smaller value for the ratio-of-variances statistic than for
the pass-through coe±cient.
Second, we ask how risk sharing has changed over time. We ¯nd that US households were
e®ectively able to insure two-thirds of the sharp increase in wage inequality over the past
40 years. Private risk sharing increased during the 1970s: in 1967 the insurable component
of wages accounted for around 25% of the cross-sectional variance of log wages, while by
the early 1980s this fraction was around 45%. Since then, the variances of the insurable
and uninsurable components of wages have risen at a similar rate, leaving the fraction of
wage °uctuations insured relatively stable. Data on hours worked are an essential input for
these estimates, since no consumption data in available prior to 1980, and it is the observed
increase in the covariance between wages and hours that indicates an increase in the degree
of risk sharing. Reassuringly, after 1980, data on hours worked and data on consumption
deliver consistent estimates for the relative importance of insurable and uninsurable shocks.
Third, we use the estimated model to decompose inequality in the cross section into com-
ponents re°ecting life-cycle shocks versus initial heterogeneity in productivity and the disu-
tility of work e®ort. This decomposition is unique and additive in our framework. Roughly
half of the total cross-sectional variance in wages and earnings re°ects life-cycle shocks to
wages. In contrast, these shocks account for less than 20% of the cross-sectional variances
of consumption and hours worked. Net of measurement error, the most important source
of dispersion in consumption is initial heterogeneity in productivity. For hours worked, in
contrast, it is heterogeneity in preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our framework, derives
the equilibrium allocations, and explains how we obtain tractability. In Section 3, we derive
closed-form expressions for the equilibrium cross-sectional moments. Section 4 proves how
these moments allow us to identify all the structural parameters of the model, and describes
the data and estimation algorithm. Section 5 lays out the results of the quantitative analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model economy
We ¯rst describe the model formally. Next, we discuss the key assumptions in detail.
Demographics We adopt the Yaari perpetual youth model: agents are born at age zero
4and survive from age a to age a+1 with constant probability ± < 1. A new generation with
mass (1 ¡ ±) enters the economy at each date t. Thus, the measure of agents of age a is
(1 ¡ ±)±a, and the total population size is unity.
Preferences Lifetime utility for an agent born (i.e., entering the labor market) in cohort






where the expectation is taken over sequences of shocks de¯ned below. Here ct denotes
consumption at date t for an agent of age a = t ¡ b, while ht is the corresponding value
for hours worked. Agents discount the future at rate ¯±; where ¯ < 1 is the pure discount












The parameter ° is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption, and ¾ governs the elasticity of labor supply.2 The preference weight ' captures
the strength of an individual's aversion to work. The distribution of ' for the cohort with
birth year t is denoted F't, with cohort-speci¯c variance v't. We incorporate preference
heterogeneity because, as we will show, it is important for explaining the observed cross-
sectional joint distribution over wages, hours, and consumption.3 In Section 6 we discuss
how our results extend to alternative preference speci¯cations.
Idiosyncratic risk The population in the economy is partitioned into groups that
we will refer to as \islands," where each island contains a continuum of individual agents.
Agents face labor productivity shocks at the individual level, which are uncorrelated across
members of each island, and shocks at the island level, which are common to all members of a
given island, but uncorrelated across islands. Individual labor productivity is denoted w and
given (in logs) by the sum of the island-level component, denoted ®; and the (orthogonal)
individual-level component, denoted ":
logwt = ®t + "t: (3)
2The parameter ° is also related to risk aversion. In particular, the coe±cient of relative risk aversion is
1=(1=° +1=¾) (see Swanson, forthcoming). As we explain below, the most important role of ° in our model
is that it determines the relative strength of income and substitution e®ects on hours worked.
3It has long been recognized that a sizeable fraction of cross-sectional dispersion in hours worked is
unrelated to dispersion in wages (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989).
5The market structure outlined below will assume di®erential trading opportunities between
versus within islands, translating into di®erential insurance against shocks to ® versus ".
The island-level component ® follows a random walk:
®t = ®t¡1 + !t;
where the innovation ! is drawn from the distribution F!t with variance v!t at time t. The
individual-level component " is itself the sum of two orthogonal random variables:
"t = ·t + µt:
Here µ is a transitory (independently distributed over time) shock drawn from Fµt with
variance vµt, while · is a permanent component that follows a second unit root process:
·t = ·t¡1 + ´t;
where the innovation ´ is drawn from the distribution F´t with variance v´t.4
Agents who enter the labor market at age a = 0 in year t draw initial realizations ®0 and
·0 from distributions F®0t and F·0t, with cohort-speci¯c variances v®0t and v·0t. The initial
draws ', ®0, and ·0 are assumed to be uncorrelated.5
A law of large numbers (e.g., Uhlig, 1996) can be applied twice so that individual-level "
shocks wash out within an island, and island-level ® shocks induce no aggregate uncertainty
in the economy as a whole (see Attanasio and R¶ ³os-Rull (2000) for a similar structure).
Production Production of the ¯nal consumption good takes place through a constant
returns to scale technology with labor as the only input. The economy-wide good and labor
markets are perfectly competitive. Hence, individual wages equal individual productivities
(units of e®ective labor per hour worked).
Taxes and redistribution The government operates a progressive tax-transfer system
that provides public insurance. Following Benabou (2002), an individual with a gross labor
4The assumed statistical process for individual e±ciency units { unit root plus i.i.d. shocks { has a long
tradition in the literature that estimates statistical models for individual wage dynamics (see, e.g., MaCurdy,
1982). The empirical autocovariance function for individual wages displays a sharp decline at the ¯rst lag,
indicating the presence of a transitory component in wages. At the same time, within-cohort wage dispersion
increases approximately linearly with age, suggesting the presence of permanent shocks.
5The initial draws (';®0;·0) could in principle be correlated if, for example, wages at labor market
entry are a function of schooling, and schooling depends on the preference weight, '. In a previous version
of this paper, we allowed for correlation between ®0 and ', but the estimated correlation coe±cient was
insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero.
6income yt = wtht receives disposable post-government earnings ~ yt given by
~ yt = ¸(yt)
1¡¿ : (4)
The ¯scal parameters ¸ and ¿ are assumed constant over time. Loosely speaking, ¸
de¯nes the level of taxation, while ¿ ¸ 0 de¯nes the rate of progressivity built into the tax
and transfer system. To see this, note that log(~ yt) = log(¸)+(1¡¿)log(yt); and thus (1¡¿)
de¯nes the elasticity of after-tax earnings to pre-tax earnings. For ¿ = 0 the system implies
a °at tax 1 ¡ ¸ on labor income, while for ¿ > 0 the tax and transfer system is progressive.
The government uses aggregate net tax revenue to ¯nance a non-valued public consumption
good Gt; which adjusts to balance the government budget on a period-by-period basis.
While this model of taxation and transfers is simple, it is su±ciently °exible to o®er a
reasonable approximation to the actual US tax and transfer system (see Section 4.3).
Market structure All assets in the economy are in zero net supply, and asset markets are
competitive. At birth, each agent is endowed with zero ¯nancial wealth.6 Individuals born
in year b draw values for ®0 and ' before any markets open. They are then allocated to an is-
land, which is de¯ned by an ex ante unknown sequence f!tg
1
t=b+1 that will apply to all island
members. Within each island, agents trade a complete set of insurance contracts. In particu-
lar, in every period t ¸ b; agents can purchase contracts indexed to st+1 = (!t+1;´t+1;µt+1).7
Scope for insurance across islands is more limited: agents can only trade insurance contracts
indexed to their individual-level shocks (´t+1;µt+1), but inter-island contracts contingent on
the realization of the island-level shock !t+1 are ruled out.
Insurance contracts incorporate mortality risk: if an agent purchases one unit of insurance
against any state st+1; the contract pays ±¡1 units of consumption if the agent survives to
the next period and st+1 is realized, and 0 units otherwise.
Note that agents can e®ectively trade risk-free bonds freely within or across islands. In
particular, purchasing ± units of insurance for every possible realization of the pair (´t+1;µt+1)
delivers one unit of consumption risk-free in the next period.
Information Agents are assumed to take as given the sequences of distributions fF't;F®0t;
F·0t;F!t;F´t;Fµtg. Thus they have perfect foresight over future wage distributions.8
6It is straightforward to relax the assumption of zero initial individual ¯nancial wealth. The key require-
ment, as will become clear below, is that average initial wealth on each island is zero.
7New labor market entrants can also purchase contracts indexed to (·0;µb).
8This assumption is not required for tractability. Alternatively, one could assume that the variances of
these distributions themselves follow some stochastic process. The expression for the equilibrium interest
rate would be a®ected, but equilibrium allocations would remain identical to those described below.
72.1 Agent's problem
Let st = fsb;sb+1;:::;stg denote the individual history of the shocks for an agent from birth
year b up to date t, where
sj =
½
(b;';®0;·0;µb) 2 Sb = N £ R4 for j = b
(!j;´j;µj) 2 S = R3 for j > b (5)
with st 2 Sb £ St¡b:
Let Qt(S;st) denote the price of insurance claims purchased at date t from local (within-
island) insurers by an agent with history st that deliver one unit of consumption at t + 1
if and only st+1 2 S µ S. Let Bt(st+1;st) denote the quantity of the claim purchased
that pays in individual state st+1: Recall that insurers can also o®er contracts indexed to
(´t+1;µt+1) to agents in other islands. De¯ne zt+1 ´ (´t+1;µt+1) where zt+1 2 Z µ Z =R2.
Let Q¤
t(Z;st) denote the price of insurance claims purchased at date t from outside (between-
island) insurers by an agent with history st that deliver one unit of consumption at t + 1 if
and only zt+1 2 Z. Let B¤
t(zt+1;st) denote the quantity of the claim purchased from outside


























































The problem for an agent entering the labor market at date b is to maximize (1) subject
to a sequence of budget constraints of the form (6), and the wage process. In addition,
agents face limits on borrowing that rule out Ponzi schemes, and non-negativity constraints
on consumption and hours worked.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
Given sequences fF't;F®0t;F·0t;F!t;F´t;Fµtg, a competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations
fct(st);ht(st);dt(st);Bt(¢;st);B¤
t(¢;st)g and prices fQt(S;st);Q¤
t(Z;st)g for all dates t, all
histories st 2 Sb £ St¡b; and all S µ S; Z µ Z such that (i) allocations maximize expected
lifetime utility, (ii) insurance markets clear, and (iii) the economy-wide markets for the ¯nal
good and labor services clear.
8Proposition 1 [competitive equilibrium] There exists a competitive equilibrium char-
acterized as follows:
(i) There is no insurance trade between islands: B¤
t(Z;st) = 0 for all Z and all st.
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where a = t¡b is the age of the individual, and Ca
t and Ha
t are age and date-speci¯c con-
stants (see Appendix A.1), 1=b ¾ ´ (1 ¡ ¿)=(¾ + ¿) is a tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity,
and b ' ´ '=(¾ + ° + ¿(1 ¡ °)) is a rescaled preference weight.
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t (Z) = Pr((´t+1;µt+1) 2 Z) £ Qt(S);
where Fst is the joint distribution over (!;´;µ) at date t, Qt(S) is the price of a risk-free
bond, and ¢Ct+1 ´ C
a+1
t+1 ¡ Ca
t is independent of age.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 says that there is an equilibrium in which all trade takes place
within islands. This result implies zero private insurance against the ®t component of id-
iosyncratic wage risk, because shocks to ®t are common to all members of an island. Note, in
particular, that there is no self-insurance (via a non-contingent bond traded across islands)
against these shocks. Because of perfect insurance against shocks to "t, in this equilibrium
there is a sharp dichotomy between one type of risk against which there is no private in-
surance, and another that is fully privately insured. In what follows, we will use the term
(privately) \uninsurable" to denote the ! shock and the initial draws ®0 and ', and the
term \insurable" to denote the (´;µ) shocks and the initial draw ·0. When the variance of
insurable shocks is zero, equilibrium allocations correspond to autarky. When the variance
of uninsurable shocks is zero, there is complete insurance against idiosyncratic risk. In the
general case, when both types of shocks have positive variance, private insurance is partial.
9Part (ii) characterizes equilibrium allocations for consumption and hours worked in closed
form. These expressions indicate that the vector of cumulated values for the shocks (®t;"t)
together with ' and age a contain su±cient information to fully describe an individual's
equilibrium choices at node st. The power of this result lies in the fact that these are all
exogenous states. Crucially, individual wealth is a redundant state variable, in the sense
that it is also only a function of (a;';®t;·t;µt). The expression for wealth dt is in Appendix
A.1. Note that no distributional assumptions for wage shocks or preference heterogeneity
are required to deliver these functional forms for equilibrium allocations.9
Part (iii) describes the insurance prices supporting this equilibrium. The key result is
that the prices of insurance contracts on the inter-island market are actuarially fair, in the
sense that they are equal to event-speci¯c probabilities times the risk-free bond price Qt(S)
{ the price at which all agents are indi®erent between borrowing and lending on the margin.
At these prices, agents have no incentive to buy insurance from or sell insurance to agents
on other islands, thereby supporting the no-trade result in part (i).
The logic of the proof for Proposition 1 is as follows. We ¯rst guess that all insur-
ance claims are traded within island and that there is no insurance trade between islands.
Hence aggregate island-level net savings is zero on each island. Because insurance markets
are complete within an island, we then solve for the island-speci¯c allocations via a simple
static equal-weight planner's problem.10 We can use planner problems to solve for within-
island allocations, notwithstanding the presence of progressive distortionary taxation at the
economy-wide level, because each island planner controls a measure zero of aggregate re-
sources and therefore takes the tax/transfer function as exogenous. With expressions for
consumption and hours worked in hand, we use the agent's intertemporal ¯rst-order condi-
tion to compute the implied (potentially island-speci¯c) insurance prices. Finally, we verify
that agents on every island assign the same value to any insurance contract that can be
traded, and thus that there are no gains from inter-island trade.
9The distributions only a®ect the separable constants Ca
t and Ha
t: We implicitly assume that the distribu-
tions imply ¯nite values for these constants. The absence of an explicit solution for Ca
t and Ha
t is no obstacle
for the empirical analysis, since the constants can be modeled through age and time dummies in individual
consumption and hours observations.
10Within-island allocations can be determined using equal-weight island-level planning problems because




and a common sequence f!sg
1
s=b+1. As a result, groups are ¯xed over time. However, all of our theoretical
results apply under less restrictive assumptions on the de¯nition of an island. In particular, the only
fundamental requirement is that all members of an island in period t experience the same realization of
!t+1, but not necessarily the same sequence thereafter. Thus island membership need not be ¯xed over
time.
10Interpreting consumption and hours allocations The impact of the preference pa-
rameter ' on hours and consumption is readily interpreted: a stronger relative distaste for
work (higher ') reduces labor supply, which transmits to earnings and consumption. We
now turn to the impact of wage shocks on the allocations for hours and consumption.
Hours worked are increasing in the insurable component "t = ·t+µt, and the response of
hours to shocks to "t is de¯ned by the tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity, 1=b ¾ ´ (1 ¡ ¿)=(¾ + ¿).
Progressive taxation (¿ > 0) lowers the tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity because it reduces the
return to increasing hours worked in response to a rise in pre-tax wages. While full insurance
with respect to "t rules out any income e®ect on hours worked, uninsurable permanent shocks
to ®t do have an income e®ect which is regulated by °. If ° > 1, the income e®ect dominates
the substitution e®ect, and hours worked decline in response to an increase in ®t. If ° < 1,
the substitution e®ect dominates and hours increase.
Individual consumption is independent of "t, since these shocks are fully insured. The re-
sponse of consumption to uninsurable wage shocks depends on the response of hours worked
and the progressivity of taxation. Stronger income e®ects (larger °) reduce the pass-through
from wage shocks to consumption, as does more progressive taxation (larger ¿). The ex-
pression for individual consumption is not what the permanent income hypothesis would
imply. Consumption is still a random walk, but some permanent shocks (innovations ´t)
are insured and thus do not a®ect consumption. In other words, consumption in our model
exhibits \excess smoothness" (as originally de¯ned by Campbell and Deaton, 1989). It is
precisely this feature of the data that has motivated a large amount of recent research aimed
at developing \partial insurance" models that lie in between the bond economy and com-
plete markets (e.g., Krueger and Perri, 2006; Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011; Ales and Maziero,
2009).
Alternative decentralizations Our characterization of equilibrium assumes that all
within-island risk sharing arises from explicit markets and state-contingent ¯nancial income
°ows. However, one could support the same allocations for consumption and hours worked
through non-market insurance mechanisms (e.g., within-family state-contingent transfers).
Similarly, if agents could perfectly foresee future innovations (´t;µt); then a non-contingent
bond traded within islands would su±ce to allow them to perfectly smooth consumption in
response to these wage changes. We use the label \insurable shocks" as a catchall for both
11insurable and forecastable wage changes.11
2.3 Tractability of the framework
With few exceptions, incomplete markets models do not admit an analytical solution and
numerical methods are required to solve for equilibrium allocations.12 In this section we
explain how we retain tractability, and we relate this result to the existing literature. Readers
who are more interested in the empirical application can skip directly to Section 3.
2.3.1 How we retain tractability
There are two keys to tractability in our framework: (i) individual wealth is a redundant
state variable, and (ii) agents have access to perfect private insurance against some shocks
and no private insurance against others.
Why wealth is a redundant state The reason individual wealth is a redundant state
variable is twofold. First, even though the within-island equilibrium wealth distribution
is non-degenerate, allocations can be characterized without reference to it: full insurance
within the island implies that within-island allocations can be derived by solving an island-
level planner problem with an equal-weight welfare function corresponding to common initial
asset positions for all agents, subject to an island-level resource constraint.
Second, the inter-island wealth distribution does not show up in allocations because,
in equilibrium, this distribution remains degenerate at zero. This second argument can be
explained in three simple steps. To understand why there is no asset trade between islands, it
is su±cient to understand why there is no trade in a risk-free bond.13 Let rt+1 = ¡logQt(S)
11Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) and Guvenen and Smith (2010), among others, explain the di±-
culty in distinguishing between insurable and predictable shocks.
12In standard (intractable) incomplete markets models, decision rules depend on wealth, and the distribu-
tion of wealth is endogenous and must be solved for numerically. The literature has followed three alternative
routes to avoid this outcome. The ¯rst is to assume a statistical model for income risk (permanent, multi-
plicative shocks) such that the equilibrium wealth distribution remains degenerate at zero (Constantinides
and Du±e, 1996). The second is to assume a preference speci¯cation { quadratic or in the constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) class { such that the precautionary motive for saving is either zero or independent of
wealth (Caballero, 1990). The third is to allow agents to control the amount of idiosyncratic risk that they
face such that equilibrium exposure to idiosyncratic risk is proportional to wealth, given CRRA preferences
(Krebs, 2003; Angeletos, 2007). Krebs (2003) allows for human capital accumulation, so that agents can
control the composition between (safe) physical and (risky) human wealth independently of total wealth by
making savings choices in both assets. Angeletos (2007) models idiosyncratic risk to entrepreneurial business
income rather than labor income. In his model agents control portfolio exposure to idiosyncratic risk by
adjusting the quantity of entrepreneurial capital in total savings.
13Recall that inter-island insurance prices are simply event-speci¯c probabilities times the bond price.
12denote the equilibrium interest rate and ½ = ¡log¯ the discount rate. In the model,
individuals have three saving motives: an intertemporal motive proportional to the gap
between rt+1 and ½, a smoothing motive linked to expected earnings growth over the life
cycle, and a precautionary motive that is a function of the variance of uninsurable island-
level shocks v!;t+1. Importantly, each of these three factors applies with the same force on all
islands. The strength of the intertemporal motive is given by the term (rt+1 ¡ ½)=°, common
across agents. All islands have the same smoothing motive, because island-level expected
earnings growth is independent of age and of the current wage. The precautionary motive is
the same because all agents face the same variance for the uninsurable component of wages.
Consequently, there exists an economy-wide interest rate rt+1 at which, in equilibrium, the
(negative) intertemporal motive exactly o®sets the (negative) smoothing motive and the
(positive) precautionary motive, and no agent wants to either borrow or lend across islands.
To gain more intuition, it is useful to make a speci¯c distributional assumption. If each
variable xt 2 (!t;´t;µt) is distributed Normally, xt » N (¡vxt=2;vxt), then asset prices can
be derived in closed form. Focusing, for simplicity, on the special case ¿ = 0; we have
















where ¢vart+1(") ´ v´;t+1 + vµ;t+1 ¡ vµt is the increase in the variance of the insurable
component of the wage for all cohorts between years t and t + 1.
Let us begin by assuming that ¾ ! 1 (inelastic labor supply). In the absence of island-
level risk (v!;t+1 = 0), the equilibrium interest rate would satisfy the standard condition
of a complete-market endowment economy, rt+1 = ½: In the presence of island-level risk,
expression (10) simpli¯es to (rt+1 ¡ ½)=°+v!;t+1 (1 + °)=2 = 0: The ¯rst term measures the
intertemporal motive to dis-save, since the rate of time preference exceeds the equilibrium
interest rate. The second term, capturing the precautionary motive for saving, is equal to half
the variance of the island-level productivity shocks times the coe±cient of relative prudence,
(1 + °). The equilibrium interest rate is such that the two saving motives exactly o®set.
When ¾ is ¯nite, its e®ect on rt+1 depends on the value for °. If ° > 1, then hours respond
negatively to uninsurable shocks (see equation 8). In this case, a higher Frisch elasticity
reduces the precautionary saving motive, since labor supply provides a useful hedge against
risk.14
14Progressivity, ¿ > 0, reduces the private precautionary saving motive (see eq. (A5) in the Technical
Appendix A).
13Insurance dichotomy and island structure We now explain why and when the island
structure is required to construct an equilibrium in which some shocks are perfectly insured
while others remain uninsured.
Recall that the uninsurable and insurable components ®t and "t enter the level wage
multiplicatively. This means that to perfectly insure "t shocks, individuals must be able
to scale their purchases of insurance against these shocks to their future realizations for
uninsurable shocks. If "t were i.i.d., so that insurable shocks lasted only one period, it
would be necessary to index insurance purchases only to the one-period-ahead innovation
!t+1: This could be achieved by simply assuming that agents ¯rst observe the innovation
!t+1, and then trade { economy-wide { insurance claims contingent on the realization of the
transitory component µt+1. Thus in that case it is not necessary to partition the economy
into islands. However, in our model "t has a unit-root component, and an innovation ´t+1
has a permanent e®ect on future earnings. This requires linking insurance payouts to the
agent's future sequence of uninsurable shocks. The island structure is a technical expedient
allowing agents to trade an unrestricted set of insurance claims, thereby enabling perfect
insurance against the "t component. At the same time, because unrestricted contracts are
only exchanged within the island, the structure prevents agents from pooling the island-level
risk.15
2.3.2 Relation to Constantinides and Du±e (1996)
Constantinides and Du±e (1996), henceforth CD, is an important forebear of our model.
The key insight of CD is that a no-trade equilibrium exists when: (1) the exogenous process
for disposable income is a multiplicative unit root with innovations drawn from a distribution
common to all agents, (2) preferences are in the power utility class, (3) assets in zero net
supply, and agents are endowed with zero initial wealth.16 We extend CD's environment in
four dimensions that are important for a quantitative study of risk sharing.
First, our primitive exogenous stochastic process is over hourly wages and also includes a
15In our competitive equilibrium, transfers associated with permanent insurable shocks are linked to the
entire future sequence of uninsurable shocks, even though the decentralization is achieved with one-period
within-island insurance contracts. This is a parallel to the standard result that a sequential equilibrium with
one-period Arrow securities gives rise to the same allocation as the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with trade
only at date zero.
16Both CD's model and ours can have assets in positive net supply in a trivial case, namely when agents
are endowed at birth with a unit of the market portfolio and pay a lump-sum tax each period equal to the
dividend on the market portfolio each period. In equilibrium, agents never trade away from their initial
holding of the market portfolio, rendering the allocations (7)-(8) unchanged.
14transitory component beyond the unit root. Gross earnings are endogenous since individuals
control their labor supply. Showing that the no-trade result extends to preferences de¯ned
over labor supply as well as consumption is important because, as will become clear shortly,
data on hours worked are a rich source of information on the nature of risk and risk sharing.
In Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2011b) we generalize the preference class under
which the no-trade result holds beyond our baseline speci¯cation (2). We provide a simple
static su±cient condition that can be used to check whether there exists an equilibrium
with no inter-island trade, for any particular utility function de¯ned over consumption and
hours worked. We use this condition to show that the no-trade result extends to Greenwood-
Hercowitz-Hu®man, Cobb-Douglas, and recursive Epstein-Zin preferences. These alternative
speci¯cations also deliver closed-form expressions for equilibrium allocations.
Second, we allow for progressive taxation, which allows us to quantify how much insurance
takes place through the government and how much is provided privately.
Third, agents in our model di®er with respect to preferences, in addition to productivity.
This feature is important because we do not want to impose a priori that the entire cross-
sectional dispersion in consumption and hours worked is driven by dispersion in wages.
Finally, and most importantly, in our economy some risks are privately insurable within
islands, so our version of the no-trade result applies across groups rather than across individ-
uals. Hence, our model allows for partial consumption insurance against disposable earnings
shocks { a critical requirement for bringing the model to the data successfully (as shown by
Blundell, Preston, and Pistaferri, 2008). In contrast, the most direct interpretation of the
CD model is that theirs is a world with no risk sharing in which each individual consumes his
or her endowment. An alternative interpretation is that their postulated endowment process
is \post-trade" and incorporates non-modeled insurance against fundamental shocks. Rela-
tive to this alternative interpretation, the advantage of our setup is that we explicitly model
and quantify the channels of insurance available to households: labor supply (from wages to
earnings), progressive taxation (from earnings to disposable income), and private insurance
(from disposable income to consumption).
3 Cross-sectional implications
The model has thus far abstracted from variation in household composition, while actual
households in the data vary with respect to household size and the number of potential
15workers. Moreover, measurement error is pervasive in micro data. In this section, we ¯rst
describe how to \augment" our theoretical allocations to address these two issues. Next, we
use these augmented theoretical allocations to derive, and interpret, closed-form expressions
for (co-)variances of the equilibrium cross-sectional joint distribution of consumption, hours,
and wages { the key moments used for model identi¯cation and estimation.
3.1 Augmented theoretical allocations
Modeling household composition To address the ¯rst issue, we generalize the model
to explicitly incorporate variation in household size. This extension delivers a theoretically
coherent approach for controlling for household composition in the data.
Let g and k denote the number of adults (grown-ups) and children (kids) in a particular
household. All members of a given household reside on the same island. Let e(g;k) be a
function that de¯nes the economies of scale enjoyed by a household of type (g;k) such that
e®ective per-person consumption is given by household consumption c divided by e(g;k),
where e(1;0) is normalized to unity. Children receive no weight in household utility. Thus


















One could make alternative assumptions regarding whether agents can insure ex ante
against the type (g;k) of household to which they are allocated. In Appendix A.2, we solve
for allocations in the two polar cases where there is full insurance and no insurance against
(g;k), respectively. The key di®erence between the two models is that the full insurance
model implies that hours worked should be independent of household composition, while
the no-insurance model implies that hours should vary systematically with household size
(assuming ° 6= 1). The reason household type does not a®ect equilibrium hours in the
insurable household composition model is that household type has no impact on productivity
or the disutility of labor e®ort, and thus it would be ine±cient for individuals in di®erent-size
households to work di®erent numbers of hours.
Motivated by this distinction, we experimented with regressing log hours on household
composition dummies. Conditional on hours being positive, household composition explains
essentially none of the observed variation in hours worked on the intensive margin, which is
evidence in favor of the insurable model of household composition.17
17It is possible that household composition is more important in accounting for participation decisions on
16In Appendix A.2 we show that with full insurance against household composition, total

















t (st;1;0), consumption for a single-adult household, is given by equation (7), and










From this expression it is clear that if ° = 1 or e(g;k) = g; then households are allocated
consumption exactly in proportion to the number of adults g; so there are no transfers
between households of di®erent size. Suppose there are economies of scale from additional
adults (so that e(g;0) < g for g > 1). Then larger households are allocated less consumption
per adult than smaller households if and only if ° > 1. On the one hand, economies of
scale make it inexpensive to increase e®ective consumption c=e(g;k) for large households |
in the limit ° ! 0 this e®ect makes it e±cient to allocate all consumption to the largest
households. On the other hand, for ° > 0; economies of scale mean that for the same level
of consumption per adult, larger households enjoy a lower marginal utility of consumption.
If ° > 1 this second e®ect dominates.
With prior knowledge of the appropriate equivalence scale e(g;k) and the risk aversion
parameter °; one could purge variation in household size from the data by applying eq. (12)
directly. Instead we choose to be agnostic ex ante about the function e(g;k) and simply
regress log household consumption on a full set of composition dummies. We do not regress
hours (or wages) on household composition dummies because they do not appear in the
corresponding theoretical expressions, given insurance against household size. In the same
consumption regression, we also strip out the age/time dummies Ca
t (by including a quartic
polynomial in age and a full set of year dummies), and run similar regressions (minus the
composition dummies) for individual wages and hours.18
Measurement error We assume that consumption, earnings, and hours worked are
measured with error and that this error is classical, i.e., i.i.d. over time and across agents.
The log of the observed value for variable xt is then log ^ xt = logxt+¹x
t, where measurement
the extensive margin. In Section 6 we describe how to extend the model to allow for a participation decision
without sacri¯cing tractability.
18Note that the polynomial in age also eliminates life-cycle e®ects in wages, hours, and consumption that
we do not model.
17error ¹x
t has mean zero and variance v¹x. While we directly observe consumption, hours,
and earnings, we compute hourly wages as earnings divided by hours. Hence measurement
error in hourly wages re°ects errors in both earnings and hours.
Augmented allocations Augmented log allocations at time t are therefore given by
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where, recall, b ' denotes the rescaled preference weight.
3.2 Interpreting cross-sectional variances and covariances
With these allocations in hand, we can express in closed form cross-sectional moments of
the joint equilibrium distribution of wages, hours, and consumption. These theoretical mo-
ments represent an attractive feature of our framework, since they allow us to transparently
interpret the dynamics of their empirical counterparts over the life cycle and over time.
We will focus on variances and covariances across all agents of age a at date t. These mo-
ments re°ect dispersion both within and between islands. An important theoretical property
of our framework (see Section 4.1) is that the information contained in the aggregate cross-
sectional (co-)variances of wages, hours, and consumption is su±cient to identify all model
parameters and to quantify risk sharing. Thus we do not need to determine the empirical
counterparts to model islands { a daunting task, since the theory puts very few restrictions
on the notion of an island: it is just a group of agents pooling a subset of idiosyncratic shocks
at a point in time.
We start from the moments in levels, which we call the \macro moments" and then move
to those in di®erences, which we will refer to as the \micro moments."
Macro moments Let vara
t(®) denote the within-cohort variance of cumulated permanent
uninsurable shocks (up until) period t for agents of age a:
var
a





t(b ') = vb ';t¡a denote the cohort (t ¡ a)-speci¯c variance of the rescaled
18preference weights, and let vara
t(") = v·0;t¡a +
Pa¡1
j=0 v´;t¡j + vµt be the variance of the
insurable component of the wage for cohorts of age a in year t.
The macro moments for wages and hours for age group a at date t are, respectively,
var
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t(") ¡ v¹h: (19)
The variance of measured wages is the sum of variances of the orthogonal productivity
components, plus the variances of measurement error in earnings and hours. The variance
of hours has four components. First, the more heterogeneity in the taste for leisure ', the
larger is the cross-sectional dispersion in hours. Second, the variance of the uninsurable shock
translates into hours dispersion proportionately to 1 ¡ °. As ° ! 1 (the log-consumption
case), uninsurable shocks have no e®ect on hours. Third, the variance of the insurable shocks
increases hours dispersion in proportion to the (squared) tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity. Fi-
nally, measurement error in hours contributes positively to observed dispersion.
The covariance between wages and hours has three components. The e®ect of uninsurable
wage shocks on this covariance depends on the value for °. If ° > 1, then uninsurable shocks
decrease the wage-hours covariance, since strong income e®ects induce low wage (uninsured)
workers to work longer hours. Insurable shocks, by contrast, make hours and wages move
together. Measurement error in hours reduces the observed covariance between hours and
wages (earnings divided by hours).
We now turn to the moments involving consumption:
var
a
t (log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
2 var
a
t(b ') + (1 ¡ ¿)
2
µ
1 + b ¾
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t (log ^ w;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
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The variance of consumption is increasing in the variance of uninsurable preference het-
erogeneity and uninsurable wage shocks, as expected. Progressive taxation (¿ > 0) reduces
the variance of consumption for a given vara
t(®): The role of labor supply depends on the
value for °: for ° > 1 a lower ¾ (higher Frisch) reduces consumption dispersion because
labor supply o®sets uninsurable wage shocks and dampens their impact on earnings.
19The covariance between hours and consumption is increasing in the degree of preference
heterogeneity, since individuals with higher ' work relatively few hours and thus earn and
consume relatively less. The e®ect of uninsurable wage risk depends on the value of °: when
° > 1, a positive uninsurable shock reduces hours worked but increases consumption.
The covariance between consumption and wages depends only on uninsurable wage
shocks: °uctuations in uninsurable productivity a®ect both wages and consumption in the
same direction. As expected, progressive taxation reduces this covariance.19
Dispersion over the life cycle Let ¢vara
t (log ^ x) = vara
t (log ^ x) ¡ var
a¡1
t¡1 (log ^ x) be the
within-cohort change (i.e., between age a¡1 in year t¡1 and age a in year t) in the variance
of log ^ x. The model has sharp predictions for the life-cycle evolution of dispersion:
¢var
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(v´t + ¢vµt) (25)
¢var
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t (log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
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log^ h;log ^ c
´
= (1 ¡ ¿)
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t (log ^ w;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
µ
1 + b ¾
b ¾ + °
¶
v!t: (28)
None of these moments involve measurement error, re°ecting our assumption that the
variance of measurement error is independent of age and time. Moreover, because all shocks
in our economy are either permanent or i.i.d., all of these moments are independent of age.
The rise in wage inequality over the life cycle is determined by the variance of the inno-
vations to the permanent insurable and uninsurable components, and by the change in the
variance of the transitory insurable component. Wage dispersion will increase over the life
cycle as permanent shocks cumulate. The model suggests that the variance of hours should
be increasing over the life cycle for the same reasons as wages, though with di®erent weights
19Since we have ¯ltered out di®erences in mean values for allocations across age groups, the expressions
for dispersion in the entire cross section are identical to those above, but without the age a superscripts.
This follows from the variance decomposition vart (x) = E[vara
t (x)] + vart [E(xja)], where the second term
is zero if we abstract from the terms Ca
t and Ha
t in the allocations. Thus, for example, vart (log ^ w) =
vart(®) + vart(") + v¹y + v¹h, where vart(®) = (1 ¡ ±)
P1
a=0 ±avara
t (®) is the unconditional cross-sectional
variance of the uninsurable component of log wages, and vart(") is the corresponding variance for the
insurable component of wages.
20on the insurable and uninsurable permanent variances. In the log-consumption utility case
(° = 1), only the former matters for hours.
Whether the covariance between wages and hours rises or falls over the life cycle depends
on risk aversion and the relative size of permanent and transitory innovations. When ° > 1;
the cumulation of permanent uninsurable shocks pushes the covariance down as individuals
age, while the cumulation of permanent insurable shocks pulls the covariance up.
The change in the variance of consumption over the life cycle is determined by the variance
of uninsurable productivity shocks. The uninsurable-wage-shock coe±cient for consumption
is exactly one when ¿ = 0 and either ° = 1 or ¾ ! 1.
When ° > 1, hours move up in response to a negative uninsurable wage shock, while con-
sumption moves down, driving the consumption-hours covariance down over the life cycle as
vara
t(®) rises with age. Finally, the model predicts that the covariance between consumption
and wages will increase over the life cycle, in proportion to v!t.
Micro moments Micro moments are computed as variances and covariances of individual
changes in log wages and log hours between t ¡ 1 and t.20 Let ¢log ^ xt ´ log ^ xt ¡ log ^ xt¡1
denote the observed individual growth rate for variable ^ x, and let vara
t (¢log ^ x) be its cross-
sectional variance, for the set of individuals of age a at date t for whom variable ^ x is observed
at both t ¡ 1 and t :
var
a





























(v´t + vµt + vµ;t¡1) ¡ 2v¹h (31)
Again, the model implies that the variances and covariances of individual growth rates
should be invariant to age and thus common across cohorts. Similar expressions obtain for







2 log ^ w
¢
= v!t + v!;t¡1 + v´t + v´;t¡1 + vµt + vµ;t¡2 + 2v¹y + 2v¹h: (32)
20Given the speci¯cation of the stochastic process for shocks and measurement error, in the model covari-
ances of the individual changes are all zero beyond lag one. Moreover, we omit moments involving changes
in consumption, since we do not use the longitudinal dimension of CEX. The panel aspect of CEX is quite
weak. It consists of two, generally noisy, observations spaced nine months apart. See Davis (2003) for a
discussion.
21As we shall see, such moments are especially useful for exploiting the PSID data in the years
when the survey was conducted biannually.
Finally, note that all of our cross-sectional moments are the sum of additively sepa-
rable terms capturing the roles of preference heterogeneity, insurable productivity shocks,
uninsurable productivity shocks, and measurement error. This implies that (co-)variance de-
compositions are always unique, in sharp contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Keane and
Wolpin, 1997; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004a; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
2010b), where decompositions must be obtained by simulation, and where the sequence in
which various model ingredients are added or removed typically a®ects their measured con-
tribution to moments of interest. In Section 4.3 we document our decompositions in detail.
4 Identi¯cation, data, and estimation
In this section, we ¯rst exploit the closed-form cross-sectional moments to prove identi¯cation
of the model parameters. Next, we describe the data used for the structural estimation, and
¯nally we discuss our estimation method. We estimate all structural parameters except ± and
¿; which are set exogenously. Both macro and micro moments contain valuable information
about parameters, and both are used to identify and estimate the model.
4.1 Identi¯cation
The conditions for identi¯cation depend on data availability. We therefore consider an array
of di®erent scenarios. Our baseline scenario (Proposition 2 below) is that one has access to an
unbalanced panel on wages and hours (e.g., the PSID) and a repeated cross section on wages,
hours, and consumption (e.g., the CEX). Next, we consider several variants encompassing
alternative data structures.
Proposition 2 [identification] With an unbalanced panel on wages and hours and a
repeated cross section on consumption, wages, and hours from t = 1;;T, the parame-









t=2 are identi¯ed. The sums v´T + vµT and v·0T + vµT are also identi¯ed.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We now consider two alternative data structures that re°ect additional limitations of
available survey data for the United States. The ¯rst constraint is that consumption data in
22the CEX are available only from 1980, while the PSID starts in 1967. The second limitation
is that, starting in 1996, the PSID becomes biannual. Since we estimate the model by
combining the PSID and the CEX, these next two corollaries are important for us.
Corollary 2.1 [limited consumption data] Suppose available data comprise an
unbalanced panel on wages and hours from t = 1;:::;T and a repeated cross section on
consumption, wages, and hours for at least two years ^ t and ^ t + 1, where 1 · ^ t < T. Then,
parameter identi¯cation is exactly as in Proposition 2.
Corollary 2.2 [biannual panel data] Suppose available data comprise an unbal-
anced panel on wages and hours and a repeated cross section on wages, hours, and consump-
tion, where the cross-sectional data on consumption are annual for all years t = 1;:::;T; while
the panel data on wages and hours are annual only until year ^ t and biannual thereafter, i.e.,
data are available for the years t = 1;2;:::;^ t and t = ^ t+2;^ t+4;:::;T ¡2;T. Then, one can









and fvµt;v·0t;v´;t¡1 + v´tg for the years t = ^ t + 2;^ t + 4;:::;T ¡ 2, as well as the sums
fv´;T¡1 + v´;T + vµ;Tg and fv·0;T + vµ;Tg.
It is also straightforward to prove that, up to the composition of insurable shocks (i.e.,
the split between vµt, v´t, and v·0t), the model is also identi¯ed with only cross-sectional
data on consumption, hours, and wages {for example, with data from the CEX alone.21
It is well understood in the literature that consumption data can be used to di®erentiate
between insurable and uninsurable shocks (see, e.g., Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Blundell
and Preston, 1998; Guvenen and Smith, 2010). Proposition 2 and its corollaries expand
this earlier research by introducing data on hours worked alongside consumption to obtain
sharper identi¯cation. Why are data on labor supply informative about risk sharing? At a
basic level, the logic is that theory has sharply di®erent implications for the response of hours
to uninsurable versus insurable shocks, just as for consumption. Moreover, the magnitudes
of these responses are mediated by preference parameters. We now prove that, under a weak
additional restriction on measurement error, the whole model can be identi¯ed without using
any consumption data.
21To see this, note that Step A of the proof of Proposition 2 identi¯es ¾; °; fv!tg
T
t=2 ; and fv´t + ¢vµtg
T
t=2.
Following Step C of the same proof, one identi¯es fvb 't;v®0tg
T
t=1 and fv·0t + vµtg
T
t=1 : Measurement error
fv¹y;v¹h;v¹cg is identi¯ed following Step D.
23Proposition 3 [identification with no consumption data] With an unbalanced panel
on wages and hours from t = 1;:::;T, and an external estimate of measurement error in
earnings v¹y, all the parameters listed in Proposition 2 are identi¯ed.
Proof. See Technical Appendix C.1.
Proposition 3 has two immediate implications. First, with an unbalanced panel, only a
very short longitudinal dimension is required: all parameters are identi¯ed with a three-year
panel. Second, the model could alternatively be estimated with longitudinal data on wages
and hours for a single cohort.22
We conclude this section by emphasizing that this set of identi¯cation results constitutes
one of the key payo®s from the tractability of our framework. Typically, identi¯cation in
estimated structural equilibrium models is discussed only at an informal level, because the
mapping from parameters to equilibrium moments can at most be weakly illuminated by nu-
merical experimentation. In contrast, our closed-form expressions for equilibrium allocations
deliver explicit analytical links between structural parameters and equilibrium moments, en-
abling us to prove identi¯cation formally and lending transparency to the empirical analysis.
4.2 Data
Our data are drawn from two surveys, the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We use PSID data for interview
years 1968-2007 (which refer to calendar years 1967-2006). After the 1997 interview, the
PSID becomes biannual, so we only have data for survey years 1968-1997, 1999, 2001, 2003,
2005, and 2007. We use CEX data from the quarterly Interview Surveys. Consistent and
continuous data over time are available annually since 1980, hence we restrict attention to
the 1980-2006 surveys.23
Since we jointly use both PSID and CEX data, we apply the same sample selection criteria
to both datasets. Namely, we exclude badly incomplete or highly implausible observations.24
22Therefore, besides the PSID, the model can be estimated on the SIPP or the NLSY. With a two-year
panel (for example, the rotating panel of the CPS) all parameters are identi¯ed, except for v´t:
23In the PSID, we exclude all PSID oversamples (SEO, Latino) so we do not need sample weights, while
for the CEX computations use sample weights throughout.
24We drop records if 1) there is no information on age for either the head or the spouse, 2) if either the
head or spouse has positive labor income but zero annual hours, and 3) if either the head or spouse has
an hourly wage less than half of the corresponding federal minimum wage in that year. In the CEX, we
drop households that report implausibly low quarterly consumption expenditures (less than $100, in 2000
dollars). In order to reduce measurement error, we also exclude CEX households °agged as \incomplete
income reporters."
24We use an imputation procedure to adjust for top-coding based on the Pareto distribution.
We then select households in which the male is between the ages of 25 and 59, and works
at least 260 hours in the year.25 In both datasets, the hourly wage is computed as annual
pre-tax labor earnings divided by annual hours worked.26 To avoid severe selection issues,
we use wages and hours for males only. Our measure of household consumption includes
expenditures on nondurables, services, small durables, and an estimate of the service °ow
from vehicles and housing. All nominal variables are de°ated using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI-U). Our PSID and CEX samples are updated versions of those constructed by
Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). We refer to that paper for a detailed description of
these two surveys, the sample selection, and exact variable de¯nitions.
As discussed in Section 3.1, we regress individual log wages, individual log hours, and
household log consumption on year dummies, a quartic in age, and (for consumption) house-
hold composition dummies.
We then use the residuals from these regressions to construct variances and covariances
in levels and di®erences for all available age/year cells constructed by grouping observations
in any given year into 31 ¯ve-year overlapping age classes (27-57).27 From the PSID data we
construct (i) 1,085 age/year covariances corresponding to 31 age groups over 35 years (1967-
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006) for each of the three moments in levels involving wages
and hours; (ii) 899 age/year covariances corresponding to 31 age groups over 29 years for each
of the three moments in ¯rst di®erences; and (iii) 1,203 age/year covariances corresponding
to 31 age groups over 33 years for each of the three moments in second di®erences. From
the CEX data, we construct 837 age/year covariances corresponding to 31 age groups over
27 years (1980-2006) for each of the three moments in levels involving consumption.
25The resulting unbalanced panel from the PSID comprises 2,930 individuals and 93,153 person-year
observations. The resulting repeated cross sections from the CEX have a total of 87,966 household-year
observations (on average, 3,258 households per year).
26Labor earnings are de¯ned in both surveys as the sum of all income from wages, salaries, commissions,
bonuses, and overtime, and the labor component of self-employment income.
27For example, the variance of log wages for the youngest age group (age class 27) at date t is constructed
with all wage observations for individuals aged 25-29 at date t, the variance of log wages for the next age
group (age class 28) at date t is constructed with all wage observations for individuals aged 26-30 at date t,
and similarly for all other age groups until the oldest one (age class 57). Since the number of observations
in many one-year age cells is very small, this procedure reduces sampling variation. We apply the same
procedure to construct the model analogue of these moments.
254.3 Estimation method
The structural estimation of the model uses the minimum distance estimator introduced by
Chamberlain (1984), which minimizes a weighted squared sum of the di®erences between
each moment in the model and its data counterpart. Let m(¤) denote the (J £ 1) vector
of theoretical covariances, and ¤ denote the (N £1) vector of parameter values to estimate.
Correspondingly, we de¯ne ^ m as the vector of empirical covariances. The estimator solves
the following minimization problem:
min
¤
[^ m ¡ m(¤)]
0 W [^ m ¡ m(¤)]; (33)
where W is a (J £ J) weighting matrix. Standard asymptotic theory implies that the
estimator b ¤ is consistent and asymptotically Normal. Due to the small sample size, we
make two choices: (i) we use an identity matrix for W;28 (ii) we compute 90{10 con¯dence
intervals through a block-bootstrap procedure based on 500 replications.29
Proposition 2 and its corollaries indicate that, absent additional assumptions, one cannot
identify various parameters at the end points of the sample or in the missing PSID survey
years. We assume that prior to 1967 the variances of all shocks were equal, in each year, to
their respective values in 1967.30 We describe the other minor technical identifying assump-
tions in Technical Appendix D. Overall, the estimation uses J = 11;532 moment conditions
for N = 232 parameters.31
Parameters set outside the model We set ± = 0:996 to match the annualized probabil-
ity of surviving from age 25 to age 60 for US men.32 To estimate the progressivity parameter
28The bulk of the literature follows this strategy, in light of the Monte Carlo simulations of Altonji and
Segal (1996) who argue that in common applications there is a substantial small sample bias when using the
optimal weighting matrix characterized by Chamberlain (1984).
29Bootstrap samples are drawn at the household level with each sample containing the same number of
observations as the original sample. The implied con¯dence intervals thus account for arbitrary serial correla-
tion, heteroscedasticity, and estimation error induced by the ¯rst-stage regression of individual observations
on age, time, and household type.
30Alternatively, we could have treated the cumulative variances of the insurable and uninsurable com-
ponents for the cohorts alive in 1967, i.e., fv·a;1967;v®a;1967g
57
a=27, as parameters to be estimated. When
pursuing this alternative estimation strategy, we found the results to be virtually identical to those under
the baseline \steady-state" identi¯cation scheme.
31The large number of parameters is due to the fact that we did not restrict time/cohort variation in the
variances of wage shocks and preference dispersion. We have also estimated the model by restricting these
variances to follow time polynomials, and we found very similar results.
32The survival rate ± does not appear in any of the age/year moments we use to estimate the model, and
hence its calibration has no bearing on the parameter estimates. We use ± only to construct the aggregate
cross-sectional variances and covariances plotted to measure the ¯t of the model against the data. The ¯t is
extremely robust to varying ± within a plausible range.
26¿, for each household in our PSID sample we compute disposable income as income minus
federal and state taxes (calculated based on the NBER's TAXSIM program), plus govern-
ment cash payments (e.g., TANF, UI bene¯ts) and income-tested transfers in kind (e.g., food
stamps).33 From equation (4), a consistent estimate of 1 ¡ ¿ can be obtained by regress-
ing log household disposable income on log household pre-government income, including a
constant in the regression. The ordinary least squares estimate of this coe±cient implies
¿ = 0:265 (s:e: = 0:001). The associated R2 measure of ¯t is 0:88, which demonstrates that
our functional form provides a good approximation to the actual US tax system.
Around 1992 (survey year 1993), the ¯rst year of computer-assisted telephone interview-
ing in the PSID, individual earnings and hours appear unusually volatile. This surge in
volatility has been widely attributed to a temporary increase in measurement error. We
therefore assume that the variance of measurement error in earnings and hours in 1992 is
twice as large as in other years.34
5 Results
Table 1 reports parameter estimates. Our estimates for the two preference elasticity param-
eters are ° = 1:56 and ¾ = 1:69. In both cases the con¯dence intervals are narrow. Given
our assumed value for the tax progressivity parameter ¿; the implied tax-modi¯ed Frisch
elasticity with respect to pre-tax wages is 1=^ ¾ = (1 ¡ ¿)=(¾ + ¿) = 0:38, a value that is
broadly consistent with the microeconomic evidence (see, e.g., Keane, 2011).
The average estimated values for the variances of uninsurable and insurable permanent
wage shocks (v! and v´) and corresponding cohort e®ects (v®0 and v·0) indicate that almost
40% of permanent life-cycle wage innovations are insurable, while less than 30% of initial
wage variation at labor market entry is insurable. The estimated average transitory wage
variance is vµ = 0:042, an order of magnitude larger than the variance of permanent shocks.
The entire time series for these variances are reported in Table 5 in the Technical Appendix.
Finally, our estimates for the variances of measurement error in log hours worked, individual
earnings, and household consumption are, respectively, 0:035, 0, and 0:053.35
33Since state income taxes from TAXSIM are only available from 1978, we exclude years 1967-1977 in this
calculation. See Appendix B in Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) for details.
34It is straightforward the derive the new theoretical moments in levels for 1992, in ¯rst di®erences for
1992-1993, and second di®erences for 1992 and 1994.
35The estimate of zero measurement error in earnings might seem surprising. However, Gottschalk and
Huynh (2010) ¯nd that the cross-sectional variance of true earnings is greater, rather than smaller, than that
27Table 1: Baseline Parameter Estimates
Preference Elasticities Life-Cycle Shocks
¾ ° v! v´ vµ
1.686 1.555 0.0065 0.0040 0.042
[1:581;1:871] [1:502;1:641] [0:002;0:013] [0:001;0:008] [0:034;0:050]
Initial Heterogeneity Measurement Error
v®0 v·0 v' v¹y v¹h v¹c
0.109 0.040 0.517 0.000 0.035 0.053
[0:093;0:123] [0:019;0:063] [0:448;0:625] [0:000;0:000] [0:034;0:036] [0:051;0:055]
Notes: Bars denote sample averages. 90-10 bootstrapped con¯dence intervals are shown in
parentheses.
5.1 Life-cycle ¯t
Figures 1 and 2 compare the evolution of model and data along the life-cycle dimension
and show that the model-implied moments align closely with their empirical counterparts
from the PSID and the CEX. In particular, the model-implied moments almost always lie
within the 90-10 con¯dence intervals around the empirical moments. With the help of these
¯gures, we o®er some economic intuition relating the life-cycle pro¯les for inequality to the
parameter estimates described above. We then demonstrate that each feature of the baseline
model plays an important role in accounting for the empirical moments by estimating a set
of restricted models.
Understanding parameter estimates In both US and model-simulated data, the vari-
ance of log wages increases by around 35 log points, approximately linearly, between ages
27 and 57. In contrast, the variance of log consumption grows much less, by about 10 log
points over the life cycle. The much steeper life-cycle increase in wage dispersion relative
to consumption dispersion explains why a signi¯cant share (38%) of permanent shocks to
wages are estimated to be insurable.
The fact that the empirical pro¯le for the variance of log hours is fairly °at, notwith-
standing the fact that dispersion in wages increases sharply as permanent shocks cumulate,
points to a relatively low Frisch elasticity of labor supply. However, we show below that the
model ¯ts poorly if we impose a zero Frisch elasticity.
The point estimate for ° exceeds one because the covariance between wages and hours is
in the survey data. They argue that this re°ects a non-classical structure for measurement error in earnings.
28negative, indicating signi¯cant wealth e®ects from uninsurable shocks to wages (recall that
insurable wage shocks push this covariance up).36 The framework allows for one alterna-
tive way to generate a negative wage-hours covariance, namely measurement error in hours.
However, the estimation procedure does not attribute the low covariance entirely to mea-
surement error because this would translate into an excessively high variance for the growth
of individual hours.37
Figure 2 shows that the model also accounts well for the life-cycle moments in ¯rst and
second di®erences.38 How does the model discriminate between transitory insurable shocks
and measurement error? Equations (29)-(32) illustrate that if moments in ¯rst (and second)
di®erences were driven primarily by measurement error in hours, then the correlation between
hours and wage growth would be close to minus one. A substantial amount of true transitory
wage variation is needed to raise this correlation to the level observed in the data. Finally,
note that the variance of biannual wage and hours growth (the bottom panels) is not much
larger than the variance of annual growth, which helps explain why the estimated variances
for permanent shocks are small relative to transitory shocks.
Alternative models: What goes wrong? To better understand why each model ele-
ment is needed to account for the observed cross-sectional moments, we now discuss a range
of experiments in which we shut down one model element at a time, and re-estimate the
model. See Table 2 for the parameter estimates of these alternative models.
We ¯rst consider two alternative insurance market structures. In the ¯rst, we assume
perfect private insurance against permanent life-cycle shocks, by imposing v!t = 0. In the
second, we make the opposite assumption, namely that there is no private insurance against
permanent life-cycle shocks, by imposing the restriction v´t = 0. This economy captures the
spirit of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), according to which transitory shocks are
36In a similar spirit, Chetty (2006) argues that existing empirical evidence on the response of hours to
permanent shocks to wages can be used to bound estimates for risk aversion. An advantage of our fully
structural approach is that we can identify ° in an environment with a mix of uninsurable and insurable
permanent wage shocks.
37Figure 1 indicates that the estimated model exaggerates the increase in the correlation between wages
and hours observed over the life cycle. A larger value for ° would improve the model's ¯t in this dimension,
by amplifying the o®setting e®ect on hours or permanent uninsurable wage shocks. However, a larger value
for ° would also steepen the age decline in the theoretical correlation between hours and consumption. See
equations (19) and (21). Thus the estimated value for ° re°ects a compromise in an attempt to reconcile
various con°icting moments.
38For example, the top left and bottom left panels show the cross-sectional variances of annual and bi-
annual log wage growth. The ¯rst di®erences apply to the period 1967-1996, while the second di®erences
refer to 1967-2006.
29Table 2: Parameter Estimates: Alternative Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
¾ 1.686 2.309 1.730 1¤ 1.102 1.281
° 1.555 1.376 1.617 1:555¤ 1.563 2.121
v¹h 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.031 0.038 0.035
v¹y 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0¤
v¹c 0.053 0.056 0.052 0.038 0.086 0.053
vb ' 0.054 0.053 0.055 0.057 0¤ 0.031
v®0 0.110 0.166 0.085 0.097 0.101 0.080
v! 0.0065 0¤ 0.0091 0.0056 0.0073 0.0077
v·0 0.040 0.011 0.070 0.050 0.054 0.066
v´ 0.0040 0.0081 0¤ 0.0052 0.0033 0.0033
vµ 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.037 0.040
1=b ¾ 0.377 0.286 0.368 0¤ 0.538 0.475
SSR 9.711 11.928 14.066 12.331 12.568 {
Notes: Externally set values are followed by an asterisk. The columns are (1) baseline model (see
Table 1), (2) complete markets for all shocks (v!t = 0), (3) no private insurance against permanent
shocks (v´t = 0), (4) inelastic labor supply (¾ ! 1), (5) no preference heterogeneity (v't = 0),
and (6) baseline model without using CEX consumption data (Section 5.5). Variables with bars
(e.g., vµ) denote average estimates over time. Values for 1=b ¾ are implied by the other parameter
estimates. SSR is the sum of squared residuals.
largely insurable, while permanent shocks are uninsurable.
The estimated \complete markets" model (v!t = 0) delivers twice as large an average
variance for permanent insurable shocks relative to the baseline model. Absent changes in
other parameter values, this would imply too much dispersion in hours worked and too little
dispersion in consumption: thus, the estimation also delivers a larger estimate for ¾ (a lower
Frisch) and a higher estimate for v®0;t (more uninsurable wage dispersion at labor market
entry). However, absent permanent uninsurable shocks, the model has no way to generate
the observed rise in consumption dispersion over the life-cycle. Another indication that this
model exaggerates insurance against life-cycle shocks is that it generates much too large an
increase in the correlation between wages and hours over the life cycle.
The estimated PIH model (v´t = 0) delivers similar parameter estimates to the baseline
model, with the exception that the average variance of permanent uninsurable shocks rises
from 0:0065 to 0:0091. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated model replicates fairly closely
the empirical life-cycle pro¯le for the variance of log consumption, because uninsurable wage
shocks are partially smoothed via labor supply and progressive taxation. However, the
30model now generates a counterfactual decline over the life cycle in the correlation between
wages and hours worked. Recall that permanent uninsurable shocks drive this correlation
down, while permanent insurable shocks (shut o® in this experiment) drive the correlation
up. Consequently, the estimated model also delivers a life-cycle increase in the variance of
earnings that is much too small.
We next experiment with shutting o® °exible labor supply by setting ¾ = 1 in the base-
line model.39 With inelastic labor supply, measurement error is the only source of variance in
the growth of individual hours. However, with a zero Frisch elasticity, measurement error in
hours implies a negative correlation between wages and hours worked, while this correlation
is close to zero in the data. The estimation compromises, delivering too little variation over
time in individual hours and a counterfactually negative wage-hours correlation. In addition,
the model with inelastic hours generates too much comovement between hours worked and
consumption because it rules out income e®ects as a force to o®set preference heterogeneity.
We conclude that allowing for elastic labor supply is essential in accounting for all moments
involving hours worked.
In our last experiment, we eliminate preference heterogeneity by imposing vb ' = 0: In
our baseline model, preference heterogeneity is required to replicate the positive empiri-
cal correlation between hours worked and consumption. Absent preference variation, the
model generates a counterfactual negative correlation since, with ° > 1, individuals with
a higher uninsurable wage component enjoy more consumption but work fewer hours { see
equations (7) and (8). Preference heterogeneity also plays an important role in generating
cross-sectional dispersion in hours worked and consumption, and when it is shut down the
estimation looks for alternative ways to replicate these moments. In particular, it assigns
larger values for the variances of measurement error and delivers a higher Frisch elasticity.
We conclude this section by highlighting two key messages from this exploration of alter-
native models. First, the overall model ¯t worsens dramatically in each restricted version of
the baseline model we estimate (see the sum of squared residuals in Table 2), indicating that
each model element plays an important quantitative role in accounting for observed dynamics
of inequality. In particular, the data { and especially the moments involving hours worked {
speak strongly to the existence of risk-sharing mechanisms that allow households to insure
39Technically, we set ¾ = 500. With ¾ large but ¯nite, the model can still generate dispersion in hours
through preference heterogeneity. Given a Frisch elasticity near zero, our identi¯cation strategy for ° (based
on cross-sectional moments involving hours) fails. Thus we set ° equal to its value in the baseline model.
31a fraction (but only a fraction) of permanent idiosyncratic °uctuations in wages. They also
speak strongly to the existence of two fundamental drivers of dispersion in hours worked: a
positive elasticity in response to wage °uctuations and a second source of dispersion in hours
that is unrelated to wages.
Second, it is important to estimate the scope for private risk sharing and preference
parameters jointly. The logic is simply that both matter for the dynamics of consumption
and labor supply. If we use more restricted models for private risk sharing (by imposing too
much or too little private risk sharing), the estimation contorts estimates for preference elas-
ticities or for preference heterogeneity in order to try to match the same moments involving
consumption and hours. If we restrict the model for preferences (by imposing inelastic hours
or an absence of preference heterogeneity), the model delivers the wrong estimate for the
fraction of wage risk that is insurable.
5.2 Insurance and inequality over the life cycle
The ¯rst key question motivating our paper was: How insurable are life-cycle shocks to
wages? And what channels mediate the transmission from wages to consumption? There
are three reasons for incomplete pass-through from wages to consumption. First, labor
supply decisions determine how wage shocks transmit to earnings. Second, if changes in
earnings re°ect shocks that are privately insurable, they will not be re°ected in changes
in consumption. Third, even if they re°ect (privately) uninsurable shocks, the progressive
tax/transfer system provides additional smoothing.
Pass-through coe±cients Let Á
w;c
t denote the pass-through coe±cient from wages to
consumption, de¯ned as the OLS coe±cient from a panel regression of model-simulated
changes in log consumption between t ¡ 1 and t on permanent (uninsurable or insurable)
changes in log individual wages.40 We focus here on permanent shocks, because transitory
shocks are fully privately insurable in our framework. The elasticity of consumption with
respect to an uninsurable permanent innovation !t is (1 ¡ ¿)(1 + b ¾)=(b ¾ + °) (see eq. 7),
while consumption does not respond to permanent insurable innovations ´t. Thus Á
w;c
t is
40According to the model of the household described in Section 3.1, the household composition dummy
D(g;k) drops out when looking at the growth rate of log consumption. This implies that Á
w;c
t can be
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Plugging in the estimated values for °; ¾, v!; and v´ from Table 1 along with ¿ = 0:265 gives
an average pass-through coe±cient of ¹ Áw;c = 0:395. Thus, on average, only slightly less than
40% of a permanent wage shock transmits to consumption.41
The roles of progressive taxation, labor supply, and private risk sharing in delivering con-
sumption smoothing against permanent wage °uctuations are captured, respectively, by the
three terms in the pass-through formula for Á
w;c
t . Evaluated at the sample-average parameter
estimates, 38:1% of permanent wage shocks are privately insured. Of the non-insured com-
ponent of wages, 13:2% of °uctuations are smoothed through labor supply, re°ecting the fact
that our estimate for ° is larger than one (see eq. 8). Of the residual component transmitted
to earnings, 26:5% of °uctuations are smoothed through progressive taxation. We conclude
that all three channels play important roles in mediating the response of consumption to
permanent wage shocks. Private insurance is the most important of these channels, followed
by progressive taxation.42
While the primitive shocks in our model are shocks to wages, we can also compute a
pass-through coe±cient from pre-tax individual earnings to consumption:
Á
y;c








which implies an average value of ¹ Áy;c = 0:289: Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008, Table
7) estimate a quantitatively similar pass-through coe±cient of 0:225 from permanent shocks
to male earnings to non-durable consumption on US data. They conclude that the bulk of
permanent income risk is insurable. Our framework suggests that one has to be cautious
with this interpretation for two reasons. First, earnings are endogenous in the model, and
the pass-through from the primitive wage shocks to consumption is almost 40 percent larger
than the one for earnings. Second, low estimated pass-through from earnings to consumption
41The pass-through coe±cients implied by the restricted models described in Section 5.1 are of a similar
magnitude. The logic is that when one insurance mechanism is shut down, the model attributes a greater
smoothing role to other channels, so as to replicate the same empirical moments. For example, with inelastic
labor supply ¹ Áw;c = 0:38, while without progressive taxation ¹ Áw;c = 0:36:
42An alternative way to gauge the roles of these di®erent insurance mechanisms is to shut them o® one at a
time, and then compute by how much the implied pass-through coe±cient would increase, holding constant
other parameter values. We implement this by setting, respectively, v´ = 0; ¾ ! 1; and ¿ = 0; in which
cases ¹ Áw;c rises from 0:39 to, respectively, 0:64, 0:46; and 0:51: In this second calculation, the ranking of
insurance channels is thus the same as in the ¯rst one.
33does not necessarily indicate that the underlying shocks are mostly insurable in nature. To
see this, consider the extreme case in which preferences are linear in hours worked (¾ = 0).
The pass-through coe±cient from earnings to consumption would suggest perfect smoothing,
i.e., lim¾!0 Á
y;c
t = 0, irrespective of the size of v!t and v´t:43
Growth in life-cycle variances An alternative, and more common, metric for quantify-
ing the extent of insurance against life-cycle income °uctuations is to compare the within-
cohort life-cycle growth in the variances of consumption on the one hand, and wages or earn-
ings on the other (see, e.g., Blundell and Preston, 1998; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron,
2004a; Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron, forthcoming). The analytical expressions for these
moments are in equations (23) and (26).
Our framework uncovers a useful relationship between the ratio of life-cycle growth in
the variance of consumption to growth in the variance of wages on the one hand, and the
pass-through coe±cient described above on the other. Assuming ¢vµt = 0; we obtain
¢vara
t (log ^ c)
¢vara
t (log ^ w)
= (1 ¡ ¿)
2
µ
1 + ^ ¾
^ ¾ + °
¶2 v!t
v!t + v´t
= (1 ¡ ¿)
µ
1 + ^ ¾





This relation reveals that these two alternative measures of insurance coincide exactly if and
only if progressive taxation and labor supply are both absent as smoothing mechanisms, i.e.,
when either (i) ¿ = 0 and ¾ ! 1; or (ii) ¿ = 0 and ° = 1: In the latter case, even though
labor supply is elastic, it is not used to smooth uninsurable shocks to wages.
If ¿ > 0 or if ° > 1 (and ¾ < 1), then insurance provided through taxation and/or
labor supply shows up more strongly in the ratio ¢vara
t (log ^ c)=¢vara
t (log ^ w) than in the
pass-through coe±cient Á
!;c
t : At our baseline parameter values, the life-cycle increase in the
variance of log consumption is only 25% of the corresponding increase in the variance of log
wages, even though around 40% of permanent wage shocks transmit to consumption.
5.3 Insurance and inequality over time
Insurability over time Table 5 in the Technical Appendix contains the complete set of
year-by-year estimates for all the time-varying parameters of the model. Figure 3 summarizes
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t if and only if either (i) v´t = 0, (ii) ° = 0; or (iii) ¾ ! 1:
34what these estimates imply for changes over time in the structure of relative wages. Panel
A shows that the variance of the total uninsurable component (®t) declines in the 1970s and
then rises in the remainder of the sample period. This pattern broadly accords with the fall
of the skill premium in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, and the subsequent increase in the 1980s
and beyond. Under this interpretation, \skill-biased demand shifts" represent an important
source of uninsurable wage shocks.44 The total cross-sectional variance of the permanent
insurable component of wages (·t) is generally increasing throughout the ¯rst two decades,
but declines somewhat from the mid-1980s (Panel B). The variance of transitory insurable
shocks (µt) plotted in Panel C grows steadily throughout the sample, consistent with Mo±tt
and Gottschalk's (2002) estimates for earnings dynamics.
Combining these estimates allows us to address the second of our motivating questions:
What fraction of the observed rise in wage dispersion over our sample period was privately
insurable for US households? Panel D of Figure 3 indicates that in 1967 the insurable
component of wages accounted for around 25% of the cross-sectional variance of log wages,
while by the early 1980s this fraction was around 45%. Since then, the variances of the
insurable and uninsurable components of wages have risen at a similar rate, leaving the
fraction of wage °uctuations insured relatively stable.
Finally, note that the \cohort" plots in Panels A and B are rather steady over time,
indicating that the bulk of the dynamics in cross-sectional wage dispersion re°ect changes
in the variances of life-cycle shocks.
Time series ¯t The variance of log male wages increases by around 15 log points over the
sample period, with especially rapid growth in the 1980s. We now turn to explaining how
the moments involving consumption and hours account for the partition of this rise between
larger insurable versus larger uninsurable shocks described in Figure 3. Figure 4 plots the
evolution over time of these moments, alongside the corresponding values for the estimated
model.
Over the ¯rst half of the sample, we see a sharp rise in the wage-hours correlation (Panel
D). The model interprets this as indicating a rise in the variance of the insurable wage
component and a fall in the variance of the uninsurable component. The latter translates
into a theoretical prediction of modestly declining consumption inequality before 1980, when
44This interpretation is consistent with Attanasio and Davis (1996) and with Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2010b), who, in the context of an augmented version of the standard incomplete-markets model,
show that skill-biased demand shifts are the main driver of the rise in consumption inequality.
35our CEX sample begins. This pattern for consumption inequality parallels the dynamics of
the skill premium over the period.45
After 1980 consumption data are available and further inform the estimation. The vari-
ance of log consumption grows by only about 5 log points between 1980 and 2006, in line
with earlier estimates by Krueger and Perri (2006). This rise, paired with the one in the
wage-consumption correlation, calls for an increase in uninsurable wage dispersion and a
slowdown in the rise of insurable wage dispersion. This pattern is also consistent with
the end of growth in the empirical wage-hours correlation. The increase in the variance of
consumption over time is small relative to the increase in uninsurable wage dispersion (see
Figure 3) because, as with the life-cycle dimension, labor supply and progressive taxation
mitigate the impact of uninsurable wage dispersion on consumption dispersion.
Larger uninsurable wage shocks tend to drive the consumption-hours correlation down
over time. To o®set this force and replicate the roughly °at pattern for the correlation in
the data, the estimation calls for a modest increase over time in preference dispersion (see
Table 5 in the Technical Appendix).
Figure 5 shows the time series plots for moments in ¯rst and second di®erences. Recall
that these moments are driven primarily by measurement error and transitory wage shocks,
given the relatively small estimated variances for the innovations to permanent shocks. Thus
we can point to the rise in the variance of wage growth over time as the source of the
corresponding rise in the estimated variance of transitory shocks (Panel C of Figure 3).
These larger transitory shocks, in turn, account for the model-predicted increase in the
correlation between wage and hours growth.46
5.4 Inequality decomposition
We now turn to the third motivating question of our paper. Is observed cross-sectional
inequality primarily the result of life-cycle shocks, initial heterogeneity in productivity and
preferences, or simply measurement error? Given parameter estimates and the moment
expressions in eqs. (17)-(22), variance decompositions are unique and easy to compute.
45It is also broadly consistent with evidence from Slesnick (2001, chapter 6), who, notwithstanding data
comparability issues, uses CEX data pre-1980 in order to construct a longer series for US consumption
dispersion. Guvenen and Smith (2010, Figure A.1) impute nondurable consumption into the PSID from the
CEX going back to 1967 and also uncover a decline in the variance of log consumption over the ¯rst decade
of their sample.
46Recall that we assumed measurement error in hours doubled in 1992, the ¯rst year of a new PSID survey
methodology. This allows us to match the spike in the variance of wage and hours growth in the early 1990s.
36Table 3: Decomposition of Cross-Sectional Inequality
Total
Variance
Percent Contribution to Total Variance
Initial Heterogeneity Life-Cycle Shocks Measurement
Prefs. Unins. Ins. Unins. Ins. Error
var(log ^ w) 0.351 0.0 32.0 8.3 21.7 28.2 9.9
var(log^ h) 0.107 46.6 1.9 4.0 1.3 13.5 32.8
var(log ^ y) 0.432 11.1 22.8 10.1 13.1 42.9 0.0
var(log ^ c) 0.159 16.9 29.5 0.0 20.0 0.0 33.5
Sample average In Table 3, we report the average contribution of each component across
the entire 1967{2006 period.47
Interestingly, initial heterogeneity explains between 40% and 50% of the observed vari-
ance for all variables. However, the source of this inequality at labor market entry varies.
Preference heterogeneity is dominant in accounting for dispersion in hours worked, whereas
heterogeneity in productivity (mostly uninsurable) is paramount for wages, earnings, and
consumption. Measurement error also plays a large role, accounting for one-third of the
observed variance for both hours and consumption. The °ipside of the ¯nding that initial
heterogeneity and measurement error account for a large share of dispersion in consumption
and hours worked is that life-cycle shocks to wages contribute relatively little to dispersion
in these variables. Instead, life-cycle shocks explain half of the cross-sectional variation in
wages and earnings.
We conclude that there is no simple answer to the question: What determines measured
inequality among households? The answer depends on the variable of interest: for hours
it is mostly preference heterogeneity and measurement error; for wages and earnings it is
dispersion in productivity, predominantly over the life cycle; while for consumption it is a
mix of all these factors.
Change over time Table 4 decomposes growth in variances over time into components
attributable to changes in uninsurable and insurable wage dispersion and changes in pref-
erence dispersion. Because there is a fair amount of year-to-year variation in the estimated
shock variances, we compare the average variances over the 1967{1971 period to those over
the 2002{2006 period.
47These values are computed by taking survival-probability-weighted averages across within-age-group
values for dispersion at each date, and then computing a simple average across the years in our sample.
37Table 4: Decomposition of Changes in Inequality over Time
Total Growth
2002-6 vs. 1967-71 Percent Contribution of
v" v® vb '
¢var(log ^ w) 0.150 65.4 34.6 0.0
¢var(log^ h) 0.020 70.7 4.6 24.8
¢var(log ^ y) 0.230 80.9 17.0 2.1
¢var(log ^ c) 0.024 0.0 88.9 11.1
The table indicates that two-thirds of the overall increase in cross-sectional wage disper-
sion was insurable in nature. Both labor supply data (the strong growth in the wage-hours
correlation) and consumption data (the modest rise in the variance of log consumption)
point in this direction. For earnings, insurable shocks were even more important, accounting
for 81% of the increase in the variance. As discussed previously, labor supply ampli¯es the
e®ect of insurable wage shocks on earnings and mitigates the e®ect of uninsurable shocks.
Table 3 documented that preference dispersion explains a large share of the level of
observed dispersion in hours and consumption. In contrast, Table 4 shows that changes
in observed dispersion over this period are primarily driven by shifts in the structure of
relative wages, while changes in preference dispersion across cohorts play a minor role. In
particular, bigger insurable wage shocks explain most of the increase over time in cross-
sectional dispersion in hours worked, while larger uninsurable shocks account for almost
90% of the model-predicted increase in consumption dispersion.
5.5 Estimation without consumption data
Section 3 documents that moments involving labor supply are informative about risk sharing.
Proposition 3 proves that the model is in fact identi¯ed without any data on consumption.
In this section, we exploit this identi¯cation result and re-estimate the model using only data
on wages and hours from the PSID.48 One motivation for this exercise is that there is some
debate about how much consumption inequality has risen over time in the United States (e.g.,
Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura, 2007; Aguiar and Bils, 2011). A second motivation is
that the literature on risk sharing to date focuses almost exclusively on moments involving
consumption, and we would like to know whether moments involving labor supply tell a
48The identi¯cation proof of Proposition 3 is up to an external estimate for measurement error in earnings.
We therefore impose the baseline estimate v¹y = 0:
38similar story in terms of the fraction of idiosyncratic risk that households can insure.
When we estimate the model without CEX data, we ¯nd that the estimations with and
without consumption data deliver very similar dynamics for the insurability of wage risk.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the insurable fraction of total cross-sectional wage disper-
sion, as estimated without consumption data, is very close to the corresponding fraction in
the baseline when consumption moments are used. Moreover, the estimated pass-through
coe±cient ¹ Áw;c is essentially unchanged relative to the baseline case (0:38 compared to 0:40).
The main di®erence relative to the baseline estimates is that estimated preference het-
erogeneity is now much smaller (see column (6) in Table 2). Figure 6 shows that lower
preference heterogeneity translates to predicted levels for the variance of log consumption
(Panel B) and the consumption-hours correlation (Panel D) that are much too low relative
to their empirical counterparts. We conclude that it is consumption moments, and especially
the positive covariance between consumption and hours, that o®er the strongest evidence of
extensive preference heterogeneity. Because the model without consumption data estimates
a smaller role for preference heterogeneity, it calls for a higher Frisch elasticity of labor sup-
ply (1=b ¾ is now 0:48) in order to replicate observed hours dispersion. Although the model
is estimated without consumption data, it replicates the dynamics of consumption moments
remarkably well, subject to the caveat about levels discussed above (see also Figures 7 and
8 in the Technical Appendix).49
Taken together, these results indicate that moments involving labor supply and moments
involving consumption paint a very consistent picture with respect to how much insurance
households achieve against idiosyncratic risk. This ¯nding is reassuring from the standpoint
of theory and strengthens the case for using labor supply moments in future studies of risk
sharing { especially given the high quality and long panel dimension of existing datasets that
record hours worked.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a novel theoretical framework to analyze consumption and
labor supply in the presence of idiosyncratic labor income shocks. A distinguishing feature
of the model is that it can be solved analytically. Tractability is achieved by extending
49We experimented with estimating the model without consumption data while imposing the baseline
estimates for °; ¾; and v': In this case, the no-consumption-data model consumption moments are virtually
indistinguishable from those of the baseline model.
39the environment of Constantinides and Du±e (1996) to incorporate °exible labor supply,
partially insurable wage risk, progressive taxation, and heterogeneity in the taste for leisure.
From the closed-form equilibrium allocations, it is straightforward to derive expressions
for the cross-sectional (co-)variances of wages, hours, and consumption. These expressions
allow, in turn, a formal identi¯cation proof and facilitate the estimation of the structural
parameters. We used this framework (i) to measure the extent to which US households can
insure against wage risk, (ii) to quantify how risk sharing has changed over the past 40 years
{a period of sharp widening in the wage distribution, and (iii) to decompose the sources of
cross-sectional inequality in wages, hours and consumption.
In our model, the population is partitioned into groups or islands. Within the island to
which they belong, agents are free to trade unrestricted state-contingent claims. Across is-
lands though, agents cannot trade claims that would allow them to pool island-level shocks.
A full theoretical micro-foundation for this market structure is beyond the scope of this
paper. Future work should explore whether di®erential information frictions associated with
trade within versus between islands is a viable micro-foundation. In particular, suppose there
is perfect within-island information about shocks and insurance contracts, but that neither
individual shocks nor individual insurance arrangements can be observed across islands (as
in Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001; and Ales and Maziero, 2011). The ¯rst assumption imme-
diately delivers full insurance within islands. The second may make it impossible to improve
insurance of island-level shocks beyond what can be achieved through trade in a risk-free
bond.
The framework can be extended to shed light on a range of macroeconomic questions
where heterogeneity and risk are central to the analysis.
In Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010a), we use a version of the model to explore
the optimal degree of progressivity in the tax schedule, focusing on how the optimal degree
of public redistribution varies with the fraction of wage risk that can be insured privately,
the desire for public goods, and the elasticity of labor supply. In Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2011a), we extend the model to incorporate an education choice, and quantify
the welfare e®ect of the observed increase in the college premium, alongside the observed rise
in wage risk within education groups. The framework can also be extended to incorporate a
participation decision along the extensive margin. For example, with a minimum requirement
on hours worked per period, each island will choose an island-speci¯c cuto® such that agents
with low realizations of "t do not work. Finally, it is also possible to introduce aggregate
40shocks that are correlated with the variance of idiosyncratic risk, as in Constantinides and
Du±e (1996) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004b), and non time-separable Epstein-
Zin preferences. Such an extended setup is a natural environment for studying asset pricing,
and the welfare costs of business cycles.
Many of these issues have been extensively explored using conventional incomplete-
markets models and numerical solution methods. The reason to revisit them is that our
framework remains tractable when extended along these dimensions, making the economic
forces at play transparent and readily quanti¯able.
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44A Appendix for Publication
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is in two parts. In the ¯rst we describe a planner's problem and show that the solution to
this problem is the allocations for consumption and hours described in Proposition 1, part (ii). In
the second, we decentralize these allocations in a competitive equilibrium and show that the asset
prices described in Proposition 1, part (iii), and the no-inter-island-trade result described in part
(i) form part of this decentralization. In what follows, we omit some technical details the proof.
See Technical Appendix A for a complete derivation.
Planner's allocations: We ¯rst solve for equilibrium allocations for consumption and hours
worked by solving a set of static planning problems. Each island-level planner maximizes equally
weighted period utility for a set of agents that share a common age a, a common preference weight
'; and a common wage component ®t: Let xt = (a;';®t) denote these island-level components
of the individual state. Each island-level planner controls a set of agents with the age-speci¯c
population distributions for the wage components Fa
·;t and Fµ;t. Let Fa
";t denote the implied age-
speci¯c distribution over ·t + µt: The planner's problem on an island de¯ned by xt is to choose


















";t = 0: (A1)
Combine the ¯rst-order conditions with respect to ct and ht to get




















Substituting (A2) into (A1), using the de¯nition for the tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity b ¾ = (¾ +
¿)=(1 ¡ ¿), and rearranging yields the expressions for ct and ht in eq. (7)-(8), where Ca
t and Ha
t




b ¾ + °





(1 ¡ ¿)(b ¾ + °)
((1 ¡ °)log¸ + log(1 ¡ ¿)) ¡
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Decentralization (prices): To decentralize the solution to the above planner's problem, we
start by conjecturing prices in this equilibrium. Pre-tax wages equal individual labor productivity,
w(xt;"t) = exp(®t + "t). At this wage, the intratemporal ¯rst-order condition from the agent's
problem described in Section 2.1 is identical to the intra-temporal ¯rst order condition for the
planner described in eq. (A2). Thus at competitive wages and the conjectured allocations (eqs.
7 and 8), agents are optimizing on the intra-temporal margin. At ¯rst blush this might seem
surprising, given the presence of progressive earnings taxation in the economy. Recall, however,
45that individual agents (in the competitive equilibrium) and island-level planners (in the problem
described above) are both atomistic and take the tax/transfer system parameters as exogenous.
To conjecture equilibrium prices for intertemporal insurance claims, it is convenient to revert




: The intertemporal ¯rst-order condition from the agent's problem
(Section 2.1) de¯nes the price at which an agent of age a with history st is willing, on the margin,
to buy or sell a set of insurance contracts Bt(S;st) that pay ±¡1 units of consumption if and only if
st+1 = (!t+1;´t+1;µt+1) 2 S µ S. This price is simply the average marginal rate of substitution in
those states. Substituting in the expression for consumption (7) yields the expression for Qt
¡
S;st¢





= Qt(S): insurance prices are independent of the individual history st
and age a: From eq. (9) there are two pieces to this result. First, Fs;t+1; the joint distribution
over st+1 = (!t+1;´t+1;µt+1) at t + 1; is independent of st and thus the second term in eq. (9)
is independent of st: Second, insurance prices are also independent of age a; because the growth






is independent of age, re°ecting the permanent-transitory
model for individual productivity dynamics. Note also that due to full insurance against (´t+1;µt+1),
the price of insurance against ´t+1 and µt+1 simply re°ects probabilities, while the price of insurance
against !t+1 also re°ects the conditional marginal rate of substitution, with insurance against low
!t+1 realizations being more expensive than equally likely high !t+1 realizations.
We now turn to the price function for insurance claims traded across islands. Because any
contract that can be traded between islands can also be traded within an island, the inter-island
price for a claim that pays ±¡1 units of consumption i® st+1 2 Z must, by arbitrage, equal the




= Pr((´t+1;µt+1) 2 Z) £
Qt(S) = Q¤
t (Z), where Qt (S) is the price of insurance against all states (i.e., a risk-free bond).
Thus these prices are just probabilities times Qt (S).
Decentralization (asset purchases): We now derive asset purchases, Bt(st+1;st) and
B¤
t (´t+1;µt+1;st) and verify that agents' budget constraints are satis¯ed in equilibrium.
Given that any available inter-island insurance contract can be purchased at the same price
on the within-island market, B¤
t (´t+1;µt+1;st) = 0 for all (´t+1;µt+1) is consistent with individual
optimization (Proposition 1, part (iii)). Thus, agents are optimizing by purchasing all their insur-






agent has an incentive to try to sell insurance to an agent located on another island. To understand
this, note that the price at which one agent (say agent i1) with history st
i1 is willing to buy, on
the margin, a set of claims that pay if and only if (´t+1;µt+1) 2 Z is the probability of that event






price at which a second agent on a di®erent island (agent i2 with history st
i2) is willing to sell
this insurance to agent i1 is the same probability times agent i2's expected marginal rate of sub-





. If agents i1 and i2 did not share the same marginal










), then there could be no equilibrium without
inter-island trade, because any such equilibrium would feature unexploited gains from trade. Thus,
Qt(S;st) = Qt(S) is the crucial result supporting an absence of inter-island trade.
Finally, we now derive an expression for purchases of state-contingent claims, Bt(st+1;st); and
verify budget balance. Given B¤
t (Z;st) = 0 8Z;8st, realized wealth at st implicitly de¯nes insurance
purchases Bt¡1(st;st¡1) = ±dt(st). Since insurance payouts must deliver the discounted present






























st+j¢¢1¡¿ is the net transfer in period t + j.
Given this guess for dt(st); it is straightforward to verify that the agent's budget constraint is
satis¯ed (see Technical Appendix A for a complete derivation).
A.2 The household model of Section 3
Full insurance against (g;k): Assume that utility for individual i in a household of g adult













where c is household consumption and hi is agent i's hours worked. The household attaches equal
weights to all adults and no weight to the children.
As in Section A.1, let xt = (a;';®t) denote the island-level components of the individual state.
The planner can insure against realizations of "t, g, and k. The planner problem is to choose































dFt (g;k) = 0; (A4)
where eqs. (A3)-(A4) incorporate the within-island distribution Ft (g;k) of household workers
and children, and where, based on the result in Section A.1, we have already let consumption be
independent of "t.
The ¯rst-order condition w.r.t. ct implies that consumption for a (g;k) household is







Combine the ¯rst-order conditions w.r.t. ct and hit with eqs. (A4)-(A5) to derive an expression
for ct (xt;1;0). De¯ne D(g;k) ´ (logg)=° ¡ (1 ¡ °)=° log(e(g;k)). Then use eq. (A5) and
the de¯nitions for b ¾ and b ' to derive the equilibrium allocations for household consumption and
individual hours,
logct (xt;g;k) = D(g;k) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿) b ' + (1 ¡ ¿)
µ
1 + b ¾




loghit (xt;"t;g;k) = ¡b ' +
µ
1 ¡ °







where expressions for Ca
t and Ha
t are in Technical Appendix B.1. Note that hours do not depend
on (g;k)
47No insurance against (g;k): Consider now the model without insurance against household
type. In this model, there is no within-island variation in household composition (g;k). Thus
the island-level components of the individual state are xt = (a;';®t;g;k), and the island planner
problem corresponding to the competitive equilibrium is to choose a number ct(xt) and functions























¸[exp(®t + "it)hit (xt;"t)]
1¡¿ dFa
"t = 0:
In Technical Appendix B.2 we derive the following allocations:
logct(xt) = Dc (g;k) ¡ (1 ¡ ¿) b ' + (1 ¡ ¿)
µ
1 + b ¾




loghit(xt;"t) = Dh (g;k) ¡ b ' +
1 ¡ °






where the equivalization dummies are Dc (g;k) = ((1 + b ¾)logg ¡ (1 ¡ °)loge(g;k))=(b ¾ + °) and
Dh (g;k) = (Dc (g;k) ¡ logg)=(1 ¡ ¿).
A.3 Proofs of Identi¯cation
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is organized in four recursive steps.




t=2 are identi¯ed from
within-cohort changes in the macro moments, ¢vara
t (log ^ w); ¢vara
t (log^ h); ¢vara
t (log ^ c), and
¢cova
t (log ^ w;log ^ c), all available from t = 2;:::;T. These parameters are identi¯ed recursively
as follows. Each element of the sequence fv!tg
T
t=2 is identi¯ed by:
¢cova
t (log ^ w;log ^ c)
2 =¢vara
t (log ^ c) = v!t:
Given v!t, each element of the sequence fv´t + ¢vµtg
T
t=2 is identi¯ed by
¢vara
t (log ^ w) = v!t + (v´t + ¢vµt):
Given v!t and v´t + ¢vµt, the tax-modi¯ed Frisch elasticity b ¾ is identi¯ed by
¢vara
t (log^ h) = [¢cova
t (log^ h;log ^ c)=¢cova
t (log ^ w;log ^ c)]2v!t + 1=b ¾2 (v´t + ¢vµt):
Given b ¾, the parameter ° is identi¯ed by
¢cova
t (log^ h;log ^ c)=¢cova
t (log ^ w;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ °)=(b ¾ + °):
Step B. Since b ¾ is known, the variances of transitory insurable shocks fvµtg
T¡1
t=1 are identi¯ed
from the di®erence between the dispersion in growth rates (\micro moments") and the growth rate
of within-cohort dispersion (\macro moments") available from t = 2;:::;T:
cova
t (¢log ^ w;¢log^ h) + vara
t (¢log^ h) ¡ ¢cova
t (log ^ w;log^ h) ¡ ¢vara
t (log^ h) = 2(1 + b ¾)=b ¾2 vµ;t¡1:
48Combining the sequence fvµtg
T¡1




t=2 . Substituting the value
for vµ;T¡1 into (v´T + ¢vµT) from Step A identi¯es (v´T + vµT).
Step C. Since b ¾ and ° are known, the following moments, available for all t = 1;:::;T and






t (log ^ w;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)(1 + b ¾)=(b ¾ + °) v®0t
cov0




t=1 and (v·0T + vµT) are identi¯ed from
cov0
t(log ^ w;log^ h) + var0
t(log^ h) = vb 't + (1 ¡ °)(1 + b ¾)=(b ¾ + °)
2 v®0t + (1 + b ¾)=b ¾2 (v·0t + vµt):
Step D. Finally, the variances of measurement error fv¹y;v¹h;v¹cg are identi¯ed from the
following moments in levels, for example those corresponding to the youngest age group:
cov0
t(log ^ w;log^ h) = (1 ¡ °)=(b ¾ + °) v®0t + 1=b ¾ (v·0t + vµt) ¡ v¹h
var0
t (log ^ w) = v®0t + (v·0t + vµt) + v¹y + v¹h
var0
t (log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
2 vb 't + (1 ¡ ¿)
2 (1 + b ¾)
2 =(b ¾ + °)
2 v®0t + v¹c:
A.3.2 Proof of Corollary 2.1
At dates t = ^ t;^ t + 1, the data availability is the same as in Proposition 2, and hence one can
identify v¹y. Applying Proposition 3 to dates other than (^ t;^ t + 1) when only wage and hours data
are available, the whole model is then identi¯ed.
A.3.3 Proof of Corollary 2.2









t=2, and the sums v´;^ t + vµ;^ t and v·0^ t + vµ^ t.
From the cross-sectional moment ¢vara
t (log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)
2 (1 + b ¾)
2 =(b ¾ + °)
2 v!t, which is avail-
able every year, we can identify fv!tg
T





the moments, available in every year,
cov0
t (log ^ w;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)(1 + b ¾)=(b ¾ + °) v®0t
cov0
t(log^ h;log ^ c) = (1 ¡ ¿)vb 't + (1 ¡ ¿)(1 + b ¾)(1 ¡ °)=(b ¾ + °)
2 v®0t:
By combining the moments
cova
t (¢2 log ^ w;¢2 log^ h)+vara
t (¢2 log^ h)¡¢2cova
t (log ^ w;log^ h)¡¢2vara
t (log^ h) = 2(1 + b ¾)=b ¾2 vµ;t¡2;
we identify fvµtg for the biannual years t = ^ t;^ t+2;^ t+4;:::;T ¡2. Note that, since vµ;^ t is identi¯ed,
so are v´;^ t and v·0^ t. From ¢2vara
t (log ^ w) = v!t +v!;t¡1 +(v´t + v´;t¡1 + vµt ¡ vµ;t¡2), available for
t = ^ t;^ t+2;:::;T, we can identify the sum
©
v´t + v´;t¡1 + ¢2vµt
ª
. This, together with the sequence
fvµ;tg, available for t = ^ t;^ t + 2;:::;T, allows us to identify fv´t + v´;t¡1g for the biannual years
t = ^ t;^ t + 2;^ t + 4;:::;T ¡ 2, as well as fv´T + v´;T¡1 + vµTg. Finally, consider the moment
var0
t (log ^ w) = v®0t + (v·0t + vµt) + v¹y + v¹h:
This moment is available for the biannual years and identi¯es fv·0tg for t = ^ t;^ t + 2;^ t + 4;:::;T ¡ 2
and v·0;T + vµT.
















































































Figure 1: Data and model ¯t for moments in levels along the age dimension. These plots are
constructed by regressing observations for all (age a, year t) cells on a set of age and cohort
dummies. The plots show the estimated age coe±cients. For the variances of wages and
hours and for the wage-hours correlation, we use the entire 1967-2006 sample period. For
the moments involving consumption, we use the 1980-2006 sample for which consumption
data are available. The same regression procedure for constructing the age-pro¯les is applied
to the data and to the model-generated moments. Dotted lines denote 90{10 bootstrapped

































































































Figure 2: Data and model ¯t for moments in di®erences along the age dimension. Panels in
the upper row show ¯rst di®erences for the years 1967-1996. Panels in the lower row show
second di®erences for the years 1967-2006. These plots are constructed by taking the average
across time for each age group a: we do not control for cohort e®ects in constructing these
plots, because di®erencing already eliminates cohort e®ects from the theoretical moments.
Dotted lines denote 90{10 bootstrapped con¯dence intervals for the empirical moments.





















(B) Cross−sectional Variance of












(C) Cross−sectional Variance of
 IID Insurable Wage Dispersion
Year


















Figure 3: Panel A plots the cross-sectional variance for the uninsurable component of wages
®t (series labeled \Total") and the cross-sectional variance for the cohort-speci¯c initial-age
uninsurable component ®0
t (series labeled \Cohort"). Panel B plots the corresponding series
for the insurable component: ·t (series labeled \Total") and ·0
t (series labeled \Cohort").
Panel C plots vµt: In Panel D the \Total" line is the ratio of the sum of the \Total" series in
Panels B and C to the total cross-sectional variance of wages (the sum of the \Total" series
in Panels A, B and C). The \Cohort" line in Panel D is the ratio of the \Cohort" series
in Panel B to the sum of \Cohort" lines in Panels A and B. See Table 5 in the Technical
Appendix for the corresponding 90{10 bootstrapped con¯dence intervals.


























































































Figure 4: Data and model ¯t for moments in levels along the time dimension. These plots
are constructed by aggregating across age groups within a given year by weighting each
age group by its survival probability to account for mortality. We use the same weights in
both model and data. Dotted lines denote 90{10 bootstrapped con¯dence intervals for the
empirical moments.





























































































Figure 5: Data and model ¯t for moments in di®erences along the time dimension. Panels
in the upper row show ¯rst di®erences for the years 1967-1996. Panels in the lower row
show second di®erences for the years 1967-2006. These plots are constructed by aggregating
across age groups within a given year by weighting each age group by its survival probability
to account for mortality. We use the same weights in both model and data. Dotted lines
denote 90{10 bootstrapped con¯dence intervals for the empirical moments.





























































Figure 6: Data, baseline model estimated on the PSID and the CEX, and model estimated
without CEX data (series labeled \No CEX"). Plots in Panel A are constructed as the line
labeled \Total"in Panel A of Figure 3, and plots in Panels B-D as in Figure 4.
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